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Model checking is a formal technique widely used to verify security and commu-
nication protocols in epistemic multi-agent systems against given properties. Qualita-
tive properties such as safety and liveliness have been widely analyzed in the literature.
However, systems also have quantitative and uncertain (i.e., probabilistic) proper-
ties such as degree of reliability and reachability, which still need further attention
from the model checking perspective. In this dissertation, we analyze such properties
and present a new method for probabilistic model checking of epistemic multi-agent
systems speciﬁed by a new probabilistic-epistemic logic PCTLK. We model multi-
agent systems distributed knowledge bases using probabilistic interpreted systems. We
also deﬁne transformations from those interpreted systems into discrete-time Markov
chains and from PCTLK formulae to PCTL formulae, an existing extension of CTL
with probabilities. By so doing, we are able to convert the PCTLK model checking
problem into the PCTL one. We address the problem of verifying probabilistic prop-
erties and epistemic properties in concurrent probabilistic systems as well. We then
prove that model checking a formula of PCTLK in concurrent probabilistic systems is
PSPACE-complete. Furthermore, we represent models associated with PCTLK logic
symbolically with Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagrams (MTBDDs).
Finally, we make use of PRISM, the model checker of PCTL without adding
new computation cost. Dining cryptographers protocol is implemented to show the
applicability of the proposed technique along with performance analysis and compar-
ison in terms of execution time and state space scalability with MCK, an existing
epistemic-probabilistic model checker, and MCMAS, a model checker for multi-agent
systems. Another example, NetBill protocol, is also implemented with PRISM to
verify probabilistic epistemic properties and to evaluate the complexity of this veriﬁ-
cation.
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In this chapter, we explain what initiated our interest in probabilistic and epistemic
model checking in Multi-agent systems (MAS). We also specify research problems
under consideration, propose solutions, and present the structure of this dissertation.
1.1 Research Scope
Agents are autonomous entities with reactive, pro-active, and rational properties.
MAS are comprised of a set of intelligent agents interacting with each other to solve
problems that are diﬃcult or impossible for an individual agent. In the past two
decades, MAS have been very successfully implemented as a new paradigm for Web
services, network security, and distributed systems, amongst others. However, MAS
are complex systems where functional and non-functional properties cannot be checked
easily by simply inspecting the system models. Since it is very expensive to modify
MAS after deployment, it is desirable to have automatic veriﬁcation methods apriori
checking the correctness of designed systems. Model checking [32] is one of the most
widely used automatic techniques to verify whether or not system design models sat-
isfy given requirements. In model checking, the system to be veriﬁed is described as a
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model of a given logic, while the property to be veriﬁed is expressed as a formula in the
same logic. Model checking is a well-designed formal technique allowing the automatic
veriﬁcation of the models against speciﬁc properties that capture the requirements.
Many researchers have proposed a variety of model checking approaches for modeling
and verifying MAS [8, 10, 22, 39, 47, 57, 59, 78, 79, 95, 99]. Three processes for model
checking these systems, namely modeling, speciﬁcation, and veriﬁcation, are the main
foci in this dissertation.
Models, i.e., formal description and representation of the structure, behavior,
and object of systems, are used to help us know and understand the subject matter
that they represent. A Kripke structure, one of the most popular models in model
checking, is a ﬁnite automaton that represents reachable states and state transitions
in a graph. There are many diﬀerent formalizations of Kripke structures. Interpreted
systems, one type of formalization of a Kripke structure, is frequently used for deﬁning
the semantics to reason about time and knowledge in MAS. However, a ﬁnite automa-
ton cannot express likelihood activities. If there are uncertainties about the system’s
events, a probabilistic counterpart of ﬁnite automata, Markov chains, are used to
represent the system models. Markov chains are transition systems with probabilistic
distributions over the transitions. In our research, we focus on interpreted systems
and Markov chains for representing epistemic (i.e., about knowledge) and probabilistic
models.
Speciﬁcation, a formal method of expression the requirements of a system, is
usually given in some logical formalism. For software systems, speciﬁcation often
uses temporal logics to assert how the behavior of the system evolves over time.
Temporal logics are often classiﬁed into linear or branching according to the underlying
time structure. Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is a basic linear structure logic while
Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [44] is a basic branching structure. Several speciﬁc
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languages are extensions of the basic propositional language to express epistemic,
probabilistic, and dynamic properties. Examples of those languages are Computation
Tree Logic for Knowledge (CTLK) [72], Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL)
[52], Probabilistic Branching Time Logic (PBTL) [7], Continuous Stochastic Logic
(CSL), etc. In this dissertation, we design a new language that can express both
probabilistic and epistemic properties.
Formal veriﬁcation refers to the algorithms used to verify whether or not system
models satisfy speciﬁcation properties. For verifying speciﬁc properties such as epis-
temic and probabilistic properties, we can either develop dedicated tools, for example
MCK (Model Checking Knowledge) [47] and MCMAS (Model Checking MAS) [78]
for epistemic properties, PRISM (Probabilistic Model Checking) [67] for probabilis-
tic ones, or reﬁne some existing model checking tools to suit the speciﬁc properties.
Examples of proposals using the second approach include [105] where the authors pro-
posed an imperative programming language, MABLE, to specify MAS along with a
Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) logic to express the properties and showed how to verify
this language using SPIN [55]. Similarly, Lomuscio et al. [73] described a reduction
process from model checking CTLK into the problem of verifying Action-Restricted
CTL (ARCTL). The authors extended the NuSMV model checker to verify epis-
temic properties in CTLK. In our research, we focus on reﬁnement of existing model
checking tools by specifying general construct models to represent speciﬁc systems.
Therefore, a reduction model checking algorithm is developed for verifying epistemic




Epistemic logic [82] provides a formal language for reasoning about states of knowledge
in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI), especially in MAS. Epistemic logic is an instance of
multimodal logic that includes temporal modalities and epistemic modalities. The
basic epistemic modality is K, which is used to express “agent a knows that...”,
written as Kaφ, where φ is the content that agent knows. This formula is true if and
only if in all agent a’s possible worlds, the content φ is true. Indeed the epistemic
modal logic is considered as S5n combined with a temporal logic [104] interpreted on
interpreted systems [45]. Epistemic modalities have also been investigated within a
ﬁrst order logic to reason about knowledge and time in a ﬁrst order setting [8].
In conventional model checking, the results of veriﬁcation only focus on the
absolute accuracy of properties in the model being constructed. For example, we
can verify “it is always possible to restart the system after failure”, or in a card game
scenario that “agent 1 knows for sure that agent 2 has a diamond Ace card”. However,
there is uncertain and/or incomplete knowledge to be expressed as well. For instance,
in distributed systems, situations such as “the message will be delivered successfully
with probability of 95%”, or in auction systems that “agent a knows that he only has
70% chance to get the auction item”, or in a card game scenario that “agent b only
knows 80% of the information”. To express these uncertainties, we need logics that
can express quantitative aspects. Knowledge is extremely important for an agent to
make decisions, and these decisions strongly depend on the conﬁdence the agent has
in his knowledge. Knowing a fact for sure and reacting according to it are deﬁnitely
diﬀerent from reacting to the same fact knowing that it holds with 50% probability.
For illustration, if the agent knows that the message will be successfully delivered
with a probability 0.5, then she will probably consider other solutions such as sending
duplicate copies in order to increase the chance of successful delivery. Accounting
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for stochastic phenomena of epistemic systems and verifying the correctness of such
systems in uncertain environments are key aspects in concrete applications [39, 59]. It
is also important to analyze quantitative properties, such as reliability, responsiveness,
degree of reachability, and degree of persistence (does eventually an event always
hold?). These quantitative properties and uncertainty cannot be expressed in regular
epistemic logics. Therefore, we need to consider probabilistic aspects when modeling
the system to allow providing such estimations by assessing the likelihood of diﬀerent
events.
Probabilistic logic [52] aims to combine the capacity of probability theory to han-
dle uncertainty with the capacity of logic to express and reason about facts. Several
probabilistic logics [37, 7, 13, 24, 54, 67] have been proposed to specify probabilistic
properties, such as “the system satisﬁes property φ with probability at least p”. Like
epistemic logic, probabilistic logic is an instance of multimodal logic. Probabilistic
logic usually includes temporal modalities and probabilistic modalities. Probabilis-
tic modalities vary among logics. A probabilistic operator Pp is adopted by many
probabilistic logics, where ∈ {≤, <,>,≥} and p ∈ [0, 1]. A basic formula for prob-
abilistic logic is of the form P>0.95φ. This formula is true at a given state s if and
only if the probability of all the inﬁnite paths starting from that state and satisfy-
ing φ is greater than 0.95. (for basic notions of measure and probability theory, see
[40]). Nevertheless, as mentioned in previous examples, probabilistic logic cannot ex-
press uncertain/incomplete knowledge. We will explore methods to express uncertain
knowledge in this dissertation.
Using interpreted systems to formalize agents’ models has been useful in repre-
senting, modeling, and verifying epistemic systems [41, 56, 78, 95, 83, 85]. Interpreted
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systems capture the philosophical foundations of knowledge naturally by using pos-
sible and accessible worlds, agent local states, and system global states. In this for-
malism, an agent obtains his knowledge from the information stored in all equivalent
states of the current local state, which means that the agent cannot distinguish those
states. Thus, an agent knows φ in a given global state if and only if φ is true in all
its global accessible states, in which the local components of that particular agent are
equivalence. Nevertheless, the speciﬁcation of agents’ uncertainty of knowledge with
interpreted systems is still in the early stages and needs to be further investigated. In
this dissertation, we introduce the new formalism of probabilistic interpreted systems
and use it to express not only certain, but also quantitative and uncertain knowledge.
As a model grows, model checking can face a serious state explosion problem,
which means that the size of the model grows exponentially with the number of
components. One technique to alleviate this problem is symbolic model checking on
Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs). However, OBDDs cannot represent
probabilistic systems. Recently, Multi-Terminal Decision Diagrams (MTBDDs) [30]
have been used successfully to represent probabilistic systems and have been applied in
several probabilistic model checking approaches [37, 26, 70, 103]. MTBDDs have the
same structure as BDDs, except that terminals in MTBDDs can be real numbers other
than 0 and 1. MTBDDs are known to be compact and eﬃcient representations for
sparse matrices [30]. We will explore the issue of representing probabilistic interpreted
systems by MTBDDs data structure in our research in order to apply symbolic model
checking techniques to probabilistic and epistemic logic.
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1.3 Research Questions
As described above, it is necessary to verify uncertain epistemic properties in MAS.
There are two questions that must be answered in order to check quantitative-epistemic
properties: how to specify measurable epistemic properties and how to represent
models capturing measurable epistemic features? Quantitative knowledge can be
represented using probabilities and MAS can be modeled as a probabilistic Kripke-
like model. Nevertheless, neither interpreted systems that formalize agents’ models
nor Markov chains that describe probabilistic models are able to express uncertain
MAS completely and accurately. The problem of state explosion that exists for non-
probabilistic systems remains a problem when we specify the requirements of uncertain
MAS. In this dissertation, we 1) build a model that captures uncertainty in MAS; 2)
create a new language to express uncertain epistemic properties; and 3) develop a new
technique to verify whether or not probabilistic models satisfy probabilistic-epistemic
properties.
To verify epistemic and probabilistic properties in MAS, the issues we face in-
clude:
1. How can we model uncertainty of the knowledge in MAS in order to formalize
probabilistic (or quantitative) and epistemic properties for future model veriﬁ-
cation?
2. How can we specify probabilistic MAS to formulate systems requirements?
3. What model checking techniques and algorithms can be used to verify epistemic
and probabilistic properties?
4. How can we reﬁne existing model checking tools to verify epistemic and proba-
bilistic models?
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5. Is the proposed approach decidable? What is the time and space complexity of
this method?
1.4 Proposed Solutions
In this dissertation, we integrate Markov chains structure into interpreted systems to
express probabilistic MAS. To specify the quantitative properties of these systems, a
probabilistic-epistemic logic which combines the temporal logic with epistemic logic
is deﬁned at the probabilistic level by adding the degree of epistemic properties.
Speciﬁcally, uncertain knowledge can be represented using probabilities and the MAS
can be modeled as a probabilistic Kripke-like model. We extend interpreted systems
for Discrete-Time Markov Chains (DTMC) MPIS to specify probabilistic MAS. A
new logic that can specify probabilistic and epistemic properties, called Probabilistic
Computation Tree Logic for Knowledge (PCTLK), is introduced. The semantics for
this logic is associated with the model MPIS. Then, we design reduction-based model
checking techniques for probabilistic MAS on PCTLK.
Our proposed research solutions are listed as follows:
1. Extend the conventional formalism of interpreted systems by allowing transi-
tions with probabilities to describe probabilistic MAS. The extended interpreted
systems are Kripke structure models for n agents with probability transitions.
2. Deﬁne probabilistic-epistemic temporal logic PCTLK. PCTLK not only allows
probabilistic paths to be accounted for, but also represents uncertainty/quantiﬁed
knowledge.
3. Develop model checking techniques for PCTLK. We deﬁne equivalence trans-
formations from PCTLK formulae to PCTL formulae to convert the problem of
model checking PCTLK to PCTL.
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4. Analyze the complexity of PCTLK model checking. We prove that PCTLK
model checking problem in concurrent probabilistic systems is PSPACE-complete
and can be solved in polynomial time in the size of the model and length of the
formula.
5. Represent probabilistic interpreted systems with MTBDDs.
1.5 Methodology
In this dissertation, we put forward probabilistic model checking to verify agents’
uncertain knowledge in MAS. A general overview of our methodology is depicted in
Figure 1.1. To apply our probabilistic model checking for MAS, the ﬁrst step is to
construct the formal system model and formal speciﬁcations. We need to model MAS
in order to describe the behavior and knowledge of agents in a concise and unam-
biguous way; and deﬁne probabilistic epistemic model MPIS. Properties should also
be described in a precise and unambiguous manner using probabilistic and epistemic
logic PCTLK. Then the model and properties are transformed into equivalent discrete
time Markov chains and probabilistic computation tree logic PCTL. The second step
is to run the PRISM model checker to check the validity of the properties in the sys-
tem model. The ultimate objective is to analyze the model checking results. There
are then three possible outcomes: positive, negative, or lack of memory.
In the case of positive result, we conclude that the property is satisﬁed in the
system model. If a negative result is given, either we need to generate a counterexam-
ple and simulate to locate errors; or if the veriﬁed property is measurable, we can then
calculate the probability and analyze the uncertainty by comparing the probability
with the required value to locate errors. Then, we can reﬁne the model design and
repeat the veriﬁcation process until the property is getting satisﬁed. If the model is
9
Probabilistic MAS System requirements
Formal system model:
Probabilistic epistemic model MPIS
Formal specifications:
Probabilistic-epistemic logic PCTLK
Discrete Time Markov Chains Probabilistic Computation Tree logicPCTL
Probabilistic Model Checker:
PRISM
















(Chapters 4 & 5)
Analysis phase
Satisfied
Figure 1.1: Methodology Overview
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too large to be veriﬁed with the model checker, we need to consider some techniques
that can reduce the system model and repeat the veriﬁcation process until the size of
the model becomes manageable.
1.6 Layout of This Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we brieﬂy introduce the
relevant background and relevant literature. We show how to model probabilistic
systems and epistemic systems. We describe three kinds of probabilistic models:
discrete-time Markov chains, continuous-time Markov chains, and Markov decision
process along with the formalism of interpreted systems. We also review diﬀerent
model checking techniques and tools. In Chapter 3, we discuss three areas of related
work: models, logics, and model checking approaches.
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 present the main outcome of our research project.
Chapter 4 is based on a published paper in Knowledge-based Systems [102]. The
research questions 1 to 4 are answered in this chapter. We explain how we extend
the regular interpreted systems to express probabilistic models and introduce the new
formalism of probabilistic interpreted systems. We deﬁne a new logic PCTLK and
state its syntax and semantics. Furthermore we explain how model checking PCTLK
can be reduced to model checking PCTL and implement our approach with PRISM
[66].
Chapter 5 is based on a manuscript [98] submitted to Journal of Computers
and Mathematics with Applications. The answer to research question 5 is given in
this chapter. We review concurrent probabilistic systems and explain how model
checking PCTLK can be reduced to model checking PBTL. The complexity of PCTLK
model checking is analyzed as well. Time complexity over Markov chains and space
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complexity over concurrent probabilistic systems are proved to be polynomial in the
size of the model and length of the formula. We then explore MTBDD-based symbolic
model representation. We implement our approach using the MTBDD engine of
PRISM and analyze the experimental results.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. We summarize the main contri-




Background and Literature Review
This chapter presents and discusses the relevant background of probabilistic and epis-
temic model logic in MAS. In Section 2.1, we introduce how Kripke-like Markov chains
are used to specify the probabilistic model. Interpreted systems that are used to ex-
press temporal epistemic models are discussed in Section 2.2. Computation Tree Logic
of Knowledge (CTLK) is presented in Section 2.3. We also discuss two probabilistic
temporal logics PCTL and PBTL in Section 2.4. Then we overview model checking
techniques in Section 2.5 and compare several of the most popular model checkers in
probabilistic or epistemic logic in Section 2.6.
2.1 Probabilistic Models
Probability is used in the design and analysis of an agent to measure the likelihood
that some speciﬁc events will occur. In order to model these uncertaint events, mea-
surable features such as probabilities should enrich transition systems. There are
several methods of systems modeling to express probabilistic attributes. One of the
most popular operational probabilistic models is Markov chains [49], named after
Russian mathematician Andrei Markov (1856 -1922). Markov chains are probabilistic
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ﬁnite automata with probability distributions over transitions and are widely used in
modeling probabilistic properties in MAS [38, 39]. There are two types of Markov
chain models: Discrete-Time Markov chains (DTMC) and Continuous-Time Markov
Chains (CTMC). In DTMC, a system is in a given state at each “step”, with the
state changing randomly between steps. Thus, the next state in DTMC is chosen
stochastically or probabilistically. In [6], a DTMC model is deﬁned as follow:
Deﬁnition 2.1. Over a set of atomic propositions AP , a model of DTMC can be
expressed as a tuple {S, P , Iinit, L, AP}, where:
• S is a nonempty and ﬁnite set of states.
• P : S×S → [0, 1] is the transition probability function, such that for every state
s ∈ S, we have
∑
s′∈S P (s, s
′) = 1.
• Iinit : S → [0, 1] is the initial distribution such that for all states s ∈ S,∑
s∈S Iinit(s) = 1.
• L : S → 2AP is a state labeling function.
For mathematics treatment purposes, the initial distribution Iinit can be viewed
as an ordered list of row vectors (Iinit(s))s∈S, in which the value of every row represents
the initial probability from all states in the model. The transition probability function
P : S × S → [0, 1] is represented by the matrix (P(s, t))s,t∈S. The probabilities of
state s to its successors t are shown on the row of the matrix, while the probabilities
of entering state s from state t are shown on the column of the matrix.
Figure 2.1 (a) is a graph example of a DTMC model. S = {s0, s1, s2, s3} is the
set of states. The atomic proposition set is given by AP = {r, f, s}. State labeling
functions are: L(s0) = {∅}, L(s1) = {r}, L(s2) = {s} and L(s3) = {f}. The initial
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In DTMCs, the progress of time is modeled by discrete time steps, one for each
transition of the model. However, the progress of time needs to be modeled as continue
time in some systems. In CTMC, transition delays are assumed to be modeled by
exponential distributions. According to [5], CTMC can be deﬁned as follow:
Deﬁnition 2.2. Over a set of atomic propositions AP , a model of CTMC can be
expressed as a tuple {S, sinit, R, L, AP}, where:
• S, L : S → 2AP are as for DTMC
• sinit ∈ S is the initial state.
• R : S × S → R+ is the transition rate matrix.
The matrix R assigns possible transitions for each pair of states if and only if
R(s, s′) > 0 in CTMC models. A transition can occur if and only if it can be modeled
as an exponential distribution with rate R(s, s′) [68]. CTMC models are much more
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complex than the DTMCs. As our main focus is on agents with discrete time steps,
for the rest of this dissertation when we talk about Markov chain probabilistic models
in MAS, we refer only to DTMC probabilistic models.
Figure 2.1 (b) is a graph example of a CTMC model. S = {s0, s1, s2, s3} is
the set of states. The initial state is s0 and the atomic proposition is deﬁned by
AP = {e, f}. State labeling functions are: L(s0) = {e}, L(s1) = L(s2) = {∅} and




0 3/2 0 0
3 0 3/2 0
0 3 0 3/2
0 0 3 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Both DTMCs and CTMCs can only model deterministic systems; they cannot
model randomized distributed systems characterized by interleaving the concurrent
processes. Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are appropriate substitutes for Markov
chains since they can be viewed as a variant of Markov chains with both probabilistic
and nondeterministic choices.
Deﬁnition 2.3. Over a set of atomic propositions AP , a model of MDP can be
expressed as a tuple {S, Act, P , Iinit, L, AP}, where:
• S, Iinit, L : S → 2
AP are as for DTMC
• P : S×Act×S → [0, 1] is the transition probability function, such that for every
state s ∈ S and actions α ∈ Act, we have
∑
s′∈S P (s, α, s
′) ∈ {0, 1}.
• Act is a set of actions, ∀α ∈ Act,
∑
s′∈S P (s, α, s
′) = 1
Figure 2.1 (c) is a graph example of a MDP model. S = {s0, s1, s2, s3} is the set
of states. AP = {r, f, s} is the set of atomic proposition. L(s0) = {∅}, L(s1) = {r},
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L(s2) = {s} and L(s3) = {f} are state labeling functions. The initial distribution
Iinit is the same as in our DTMC example. The transition probability functions P are:
P(s0) = {(s0, r1, s1 → 1)}, P(s1) = {(s1, r1, s2 → 0.9), (s1, r1, s2 → 0.1), (s1, r2, s1 →
1)}, P(s2) = {(s2, r2, s2 → 1)}, and P(s3) = {(s3, r2, s0 → 1)}.
If there is only one element in Act set for all states in an MDP model, an
MDP model becomes a Markov chain. Therefore, Markov chains are speciﬁc Markov
decision processes.
Markov chains and Markov decision processes are widely used for constructing
stochastic systems. The standard models of Markov decision processes with belief
are Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs), which assume that
agents cannot observe the current state. In POMDP, an agent maintains a probability
distribution over possible observations for each action and resulting state and retains
its goal to maximize expected future reward. To deal with the partially observable
case, belief states [23] are introduced in a standard way as sets of states to model
what the agent believes at diﬀerent times. Updating the next belief state depends on
the current belief state, the current action, and observations. POMDPs are widely
studied in AI for their heuristic approaches to discovering optimal strategies that can
be taken by agents, but they cannot observe independent knowledge relation, such
as, agent i knows X and X ⇒ Y , so agent i knows Y . The formal deﬁnition is the
following [62]:
Deﬁnition 2.4. A model of POMDP is a tuple < S, Act, P, Ω, O >, where:
• S, Act, P are as for MDP
• Ω is ﬁnite set of observations that agents can explore of their world.
• O : S × Act → Π(Ω) is the observation function. It presents a probability
distribution Π(Ω) over possible observations for each action and resulting state.
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A Partially Observable Markov decision process (POMDP) is a special case of
MDP in which the agent is in a partially observable environment. It has been used to
model the uncertainty of knowledge and behavior for stochastic agents since the 1990s
[23, 48, 61, 62]. POMDP have been widely adopted in machine learning [4, 89, 91],
agent decision making [83], and robotic applications [63, 92].
2.2 Epistemic Models
An interpreted system is a framework based on a number of other possible states
of aﬀairs besides the true state of aﬀairs. It was introduced by Fagin et al in [45].
The formalism of interpreted systems, which provides well-deﬁned semantics to reason
about time and knowledge in MAS, is frequently used in epistemic model checkers,
such as MCMAS [76] and MCK[93].
Let A = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n agents in the system. Every agent i ∈ A is
associated with its local state set Li, and possible actions set Acti. Besides Li and
Acti, there are also a set Le and a set Acte for the environment, a special agent for
providing global variables and actions that all agents are able to access. Therefore,
for the system, a set of global states G ⊆ L1 × . . .× Ln × Le is the set of all possible
tuples (l1, . . . , ln, le), and each tuple represents a computational state for the whole
system. For each agent i, we also use a set of protocols Pi : Li → 2
Acti assigning a list
of enabled actions to each local state. Associated with the environment is a protocol
Pe : Le → 2
Acte that represents the functioning behavior of the environment agent.
The probabilistic transition function T for the system can be deﬁned as T : G×Act×
G → [0, 1], where Act is the set of joint actions Act ⊆ Act1× . . .×Actn×Acte that are
performed by all the agents and environment respectively. Each agent is associated
with a local probabilistic transition function ti ⊆ T . Given a global initial state I, a set
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of atomic propositions AP and an interpretation V ⊆ G×AP , an interpreted system
over probabilistic transition function is a tuple: IS =< (Li, Acti, ti, Pi)i∈A, I, V >
The epistemic accessibility relation is deﬁned to associate a Kripke model with
a given interpreted system IS to express an epistemic model.
Deﬁnition 2.5. The epistemic accessibility relations ∼i is a binary relation between
two global states. (l1, . . . , ln) ∼i (l
′
1, . . . , l
′
n) iﬀ li = l
′
i.
The epistemic accessibility relations are equivalence relations on W . Therefore,
∼i is reﬂexive, symmetric and transitive. Based on these relations, an epistemic
Kripke model can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.6. An epistemic Kripke model is a tuple MIS = (W, I, Rt,∼1, . . . ,∼n
, V ), where:
• W ⊆ G : the set reachable states of G,
• I ⊆ W : the set of initial states,
• Rt ⊆ W ×W : the temporal relation which is obtained using the protocols Pi
and evolutions functions ti
• ∼i⊆ W × W for i ∈ A : the epistemic accessibility relation for each agent
i ∈ A,
• V ⊆ W × AP : the evaluation relation as in IS.
In the following section, we introduce how to evaluate Computation Tree Logic
of Knowledge (CTLK) formulae for epistemic models.
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2.3 Computation Tree Logic of Knowledge (CTLK)
CTLK was ﬁrst put forward by Lomusico [72] and Penczek [85]. It uses CTL (pro-
posed by Clarke and Emerson [32]) as basic temporal language and adds an epistemic
component. The syntax of CTLK based on [85] is listed in Deﬁnition 2.7.
Deﬁnition 2.7. (Syntax of CTLK)
Let φ and ψ be CTLK formulae. We use p, p1, p2, . . . to range over the set of atomic
propositions AP . Given a set of agents A = {1, . . . , n} as a group, the CTLK for-
mulae follow BNF grammar:
φ, ψ ::= true | p | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | AXφ | AGφ | A(φU ψ) |Kiφ | EΓφ | CΓφ | DΓφ
The syntax above deﬁnes standard CTL operators and epistemic operators in
CTLK. The notation of standard CTL operators in CTLK has the same meaning as
in CTL. For example, the formula AXφ has the meaning of “in all possible paths in
the next step φ holds,” AGφ stands for “along all possible paths φ is always true.”.
A(φUψ) represents that “in all possible paths at some point ψ holds and before then
φ is true along the path.” The epistemic operators include Kiφ, EΓφ, CΓφ, and DΓφ
and represent “agent i knows φ”, “everyone in group Γ knows φ”, “φ is common
knowledge in group Γ”, “φ is distributed knowledge in group Γ”, respectively. Other
basic modalities are deﬁned in Table 2.1
Table 2.1: CTLK Basic Modalities Deﬁnition
Temporal Logic Epistemic Logic
AFφ ≡ A(trueUφ) Kiφ ≡ ¬Ki¬φ
EGφ ≡ ¬AF (¬φ) DΓφ ≡ ¬DΓ¬φ
EXφ ≡ ¬AX¬φ CΓφ ≡ ¬CΓ¬φ
φ ∨ ψ ≡ ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ) EΓφ ≡ ¬EΓ¬φ
Let MIS = (W, I, Rt,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ) be an interpreted system model. Group Γ
is a subset of MIS. Epistemic relations based on the epistemic accessibility relations
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and are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.8. Epistemic Relations





transitive closure of ∼EΓ . The joint of Γ
′s accessibility relations is ∼DΓ=
⋂
i∈Γ ∼i.
Let s be a state, π be a path which is an inﬁnite sequence of states related by
transitions, i.e., π = s0, s1, . . .. The (i+1)th state in π is denoted π(i), i.e., π(i) = si.
s |= φ denotes “s satisﬁes φ” or φ is true in s. Let Π(s) be a set of all the inﬁnite
paths starting at s in MIS, φ and ψ be formulae of CTLK, the semantics of CTLK is
shown in Deﬁnition 2.9.
Deﬁnition 2.9. (Semantics of CTLK)
s |= p iﬀ V (s, p) = true
s |= φ ∧ ψ iﬀ s |= φ and s |= ψ
s |= ¬φ iﬀ s  φ
s |= AXφ iﬀ ∀π ∈ Π(s) π(1) |= φ
s |= AGφ iﬀ ∀π ∈ Π(s) ∀i≥ 0 π(i) |= φ
s |= A(φUψ) iﬀ ∀π ∈ Π(s) ∃i ≥ 0, π(i) |= ψ and ∀0 ≤ j < i π(j) |= φ
s |= Kiα iﬀ ∀s
′ ∈ W if s ∼i s
′ then s′ |= φ
s |= EΓφ iﬀ ∀s
′ ∈ W if s ∼EΓ s
′ then s′ |= φ
s |= CΓα iﬀ ∀s
′ ∈ W if s ∼CΓ s
′ then s′ |= φ
s |= DΓα iﬀ ∀s
′ ∈ W if s ∼DΓ s
′ then s′ |= φ
2.4 Probabilistic Temporal Logic
Hansson and Jonsson have put forward PCTL logic in [52]. PCTL language combines
CTL [32] logic with probabilistic modalities [6, 52]. A PCTL formula is capable of
21
formulating conditions on the state of a Markov chain. Besides the standard propo-
sitional logic operators, PCTL also includes a probabilistic operator Prb(ψ). In a
formula including a probabilistic operator, such as Prb(ψ), ψ is a path formula,
whereas b is an interval of [0,1] and b indicates a lower bound or upper bound on
the probability (e.g < b, ≤ b, ≥ b, or > b). Unlike standard CTL, path quantiﬁers
∃ and ∀ are not valid in PCTL formulae; instead all path formulae are immediately
preceded by the probabilistic operator Prb. We refer to Baier et al.’s deﬁnition in
[6] as following in Deﬁnition 2.10:
Deﬁnition 2.10. (Syntax of PCTL)
Let φ be a state formula, ψ be a path formula,  ∈ {<,≤,≥, >}, b ∈ [0, 1], and n ∈ N
be an integer. We use p, p1, p2, . . . to range over the set of atomic propositions Φp.
The syntax of this language can be expressed as follows:
φ ::= true | p | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | Prb(ψ)
ψ ::= ©φ | φ U≤n φ | φ U φ
n indicates the maximum steps to achieve a speciﬁc state. There are no uni-
versal (∀) and existential (∃) path quantiﬁers in PCTL. Instead, the linear temporal
operators © (next), U (until), and U≤n must follow the probabilistic operator Prb
immediately.
In order to express the fairness of concurrent probabilistic systems, Baier and
Kwiatkowska proposed a probabilistic branching time logic PBTL in [7]. The diﬀer-
ence between PBTL and PCTL is that PBTL allows universal (∀) and existential (∃)
path quantiﬁers. Path quantiﬁers in PBTL formulae range over the adversaries and
yield Markov chains. Therefore, all PCTL formulae can be expressed using PBTL
formulae with a path ∃ quantiﬁer. Referencing to [7], the syntax of PBTL can be
deﬁned as follows:
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Deﬁnition 2.11. (Syntax of PBTL)1
Let φ be a state formula, ψ be a path formula,  ∈ {<,≤,≥, >}, b ∈ [0, 1], and n ∈ N
be an integer. We use p, p1, p2, . . . to range over the set of atomic propositions Φp.
The syntax of this language can be expressed as follows:
φ ::= true | p | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | Prb(ψ)
ψ ::= ∃© φ | ∀ © φ | φ ∃U≤nφ |φ ∀U≤nφ | φ ∃Uφ | φ ∀Uφ
PBTL formulae can be evaluated over a PBTL structure, which is a tuple
(P, I, AP, L) where P = (S, Steps) is a concurrent probabilistic systems and L :
S → 2AP is a labeling function which assigns to each state s ∈ S a set of atomic
propositions AP .
A path π is a nonempty (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequence of states related by de-
terminate transitions: π = (s0, s1, . . . ). The (i + 1)th state in a path π is denoted
π(i). An adversary converts a nondeterministic system into deterministic one. The
path quantiﬁers ∃ and ∀ involve quantiﬁcation over adversaries. PathA(s) is used to
express the set of all path with the adversary A starting from state s. We use Adv
to stand for set of adversaries for the system. Prob{π ∈ PathA(s) : π |= ψ} is the
probability of the all path such that π |= ψ under the adversary A. Let a ∈ AP be
an atomic proposition, φ be a PBTL state formula, and ψ be a PBTL path formula,
s |=Adv φ denotes “s satisﬁes φ under the adversaries set Adv” or “φ is true in s under
the adversaries set Adv”. π |=Adv ψ denotes “π satisﬁes ψ under the adversaries set
Adv” or “ψ is true in π for the adversaries set Adv”. The satisﬁability of a PBTL
formula at state s ∈ S of a given concurrent system is deﬁned inductively as follows.
1We modiﬁed the syntax of some operators to be compatible with PCTL.
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Deﬁnition 2.12. (Satisﬁability of PBTL)
s |=Adv true iﬀ ∀s ∈ S, s |=Adv true
s |=Adv p iﬀ p ∈ L(s)
s |=Adv φ1 ∧ φ2 iﬀ s |=Adv φ1 and s |=Adv φ2
s |=Adv ¬φ iﬀ s Adv φ
π |=Adv Prb(∃© φ) iﬀ Prob{π ∈ Path
A(s) : π |=Adv ©φ}b
for some A ∈ Adv.
π |=Adv Prb(∀© φ) iﬀ Prob{π ∈ Path
A(s) : π |=Adv ©φ}b
for all A ∈ Adv.
s |=Adv Prb(φ1∃U
≤nφ2)
iﬀ Prob{π ∈ PathA(s) : π |=Adv φ1U
≤nφ2}b
for some A ∈ Adv.
s |=Adv Prb(φ1∀U
≤nφ2)b
iﬀ Prob{π ∈ PathA(s) : π |=Adv φ1U
≤nφ2}b
for all A ∈ Adv.
s |=Adv Prb(φ1∃Uφ2)b
iﬀ Prob{π ∈ PathA(s) : π |=Adv φ1Uφ2}b
for some A ∈ Adv.
s |=Adv Prb(φ1∀Uφ2)
iﬀ Prob{π ∈ PathA(s) : π |=Adv φ1Uφ2}b
for all A ∈ Adv.
π |=Adv ©φ iﬀ π(1) |=Adv φ
π |=Adv φ1 U
≤nφ2 iﬀ ∃0 ≤ k ≤ n, π(k) |=Adv φ2 and
∀0 ≤ i ≤ k, π(i) |=Adv φ1
π |=Adv φ1Uφ2 iﬀ ∃k ≥ 0, π |=Adv φ1 U
≤kφ2
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For the probabilistic operator, s |=Adv Prb(ψ) means that “over the adversary
Adv from state s the probability that ψ is holds for an outgoing path satisﬁes is
in the range of b”. The condition of adversaries can be either “there exists an
adversary” or “for all adversaries” depending on which quantiﬁer is used. For example,
s |=Adv Pr<0.25(true∃ ∪
≤5 φ) asserts that “there exists an adversary such that the
probability that the system reaches φ being true within 5 steps of outgoing paths
from state s is less than 0.25”. From Deﬁnition 2.12, we can easily convert the PBTL
formula Prbφ1∀Uφ2 to the identiﬁed PCTL formula Prbφ1Uφ2; while Pr>p(φ1∃Uφ2)
corresponds to ¬Pr≤p(φ1Uφ2). The reader can refer to [7] for more details.
2.5 Model Checking Algorithms in MAS
As mentioned earlier, model checking is a three-step process [32] (modeling, speciﬁ-
cation, and veriﬁcation) to determine if a system satisﬁes a speciﬁcation given as a
temporal logic formula. Model languages are used to construct the system models.
Logic languages are used to formalize the properties of the systems. Veriﬁcation is
the procedure of establishing if a given formula φ that is written in a particular logic
and expresses a given properties of the systems is satisﬁed in a given model M . There
are two input data: the formula φ and the model M . Two kinds of output result from
model checking: either a satisﬁable result, or a violated result with counterexamples.
Some model checkers also provide simulations for locating the errors. Figure 2.2 from
[6] shows the model checking process.
In the 1990s, Halpern and Vardi put forward in [51] an application of model
checking within the context of the logic of knowledge. After that, several approaches
have been proposed for model checking MAS. In [105], Wooldridge et al. proposed
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an imperative programming language, MABLE to specify MAS along with a Belief-
Desire-Intention (BDI) logic to express the properties. SPIN, an automata-based
model checker, has been used to verify if the speciﬁed MABLE model satisﬁes the
expressed properties. Another method based on the SPIN model checker has been
developed by Bordini et al. [17] using AgentSpeak(F) Language, a BDI logic-based
programming language [87]. SPIN generates C sources for a model checker in order
to save memory and improve performance. There are many diﬀerent approaches for
executing model checking in MAS. Broadly speaking these diﬀerent approaches can
be classiﬁed into the categories listed below:
1. Automata-based approaches
2. Symbolic model checking algorithms
3. SAT-based approaches
4. Probabilistic model checking algorithms
In the following, we will discuss these model checking techniques.
2.5.1 Automata-Based Approaches
The automata-based model checking approaches were originally put forward by Vardi
and Wolper in [96]. These approaches are used in checking Linear Temporal Logic
formulae that can be represented by a nondeterministic Bu¨chi automata (NBA). By
ﬁnding a path π in the transition system TS with π |= ¬ψ, we can conclude that
an error trace exists and TS  ψ. Otherwise, TS |= ψ. An automaton is deﬁned as
Deﬁnition 2.13.
Deﬁnition 2.13. A nondeterministic Bu¨chi automata is a tuple A = (Q,Σ, δ, Q0, F ),
where
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• Q is a ﬁnite states,
• Σ is ﬁnite alphabet, of initial states,
• δ ⊆ Q× Σ×Q is a transition relation,
• Q0 ⊆ Q is a set of initial states,
• F ⊆ Q is a set of ﬁnal (or accepting) states.
The basic automata-based model checking algorithm is shown in Table 2.2
Table 2.2: Algorithm for Automata-Based Model Checking
Input:Transition system TS and formula ψ
Output: “yes” or “no”
Construct an NBA A φ to represent the formula (¬ψ)
Construct the product transition system TS ⊗A
if there exists a path π in TS ⊗A satisfying the accepting condition of mathcalA
then




Automata-based approaches can work with other techniques for model check-
ing more complex systems. In [10], authors used an automata-based approach with
tableau techniques to check communicating agent-based systems. Tableau techniques
for model checking use assertions and tableau rules which are proof rules to verify
whether the model M satisﬁes the formula φ. Assertions are typically of the form
s M φ and mean that state s in model M satisﬁes the formula φ. A set of tableau
rules are used to prove the truth or falsity of assertions. Tableau-based algorithms
work in a top-down or goal-oriented fashion, which is diﬀerent from traditional proof
systems that are usually bottom-up approaches. According to this approach, we start
from a goal, and we apply a proof rule and determine the subgoals to be proven.
Tableau rules are used in order to prove a certain formula by inferring when a state in
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a Kripke structure satisﬁes such a formula. Therefore, a tableau-based algorithm saves
on both time and space required for model checking because the algorithm searches
only that part of the state space that needs to be explored to prove or disprove a cer-
tain formula. We now look closely at the tableau rules of the tableau-based algorithm
in [10] for CTL∗CA propositional and universal formulae, which are just one part of
CTL∗CA tableau rules. (CTL∗CA is an extended logic from CTL∗ for Communicative
agents. More details of this logic and entire model checking algorithm can be found
in [10].)
Table 2.3: Tableau Rules for CTL∗CA Propositional and Universal Formulae



















Table 2.3 gives tableau rules of CTL∗CA for propositional and universal formulae.
Tableau rules deﬁne a top-down proof system. Given a formula, we apply a tableau
rule and determine the sub-formulae to be proven. Tableau rules are applied to a
formula by proving all its sub-formulae. Labels of these rules are the labels of states
in the automata constructed from a given formula. For Rule R1 in Figure 2.3 labeled
by “∧” indicates that ψ1 and ψ2 are the two sub-formulae of ψ1∧ψ2 so that we have to
prove two children of the state satisfy ψ1 and ψ2 respectively. Rule R3 labeled by “∨”
indicates that ψ is the sub-formula to be proved in order to prove that a state satisﬁed
E(ψ). The syntactical operator“?” to express the tableau rule of the challenge action,
which means that a given agent does not know whether the formula is true or not.
According to Rule R5, the formula “?ψ” is satisﬁed in a state labeled by “?”, if this
state has a successor representing ψ.
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2.5.2 Symbolic Model Checking
The traditional CTL model-checking procedure based on transition systems has an
explicit enumerative representation per state. The number of states in transition sys-
tems grows exponentially with the number of components. This situation is called “the
model checking state-explosion problem”. Therefore, it is impossible to verify very
large transition systems. There are several techniques to alleviate this problem, such
as symbolic model checking based on Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs)
and partial model checking algorithms. NuSMV [27], MCK [93], and MCMAS [76]
are examples of model checkers using a symbolic model checking technique. NuSMV
supports both Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and computation tree logic (CTL). MCK
works on a particular input model of synchronous interpreted systems of knowledge.
The speciﬁcation formulae in MCK can be either LTL or CTL augmented with knowl-
edge. In MCMAS, similar to MCK, models are described in a modular language called
Interpreted Systems Programming Language (ISPL). MCMAS supports a large set of
speciﬁcation languages, such as CTL, epistemic logics, and Alternating Time Logic
(ATL). We usually use Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) to symbolically
express the states and transitions.
An OBDD model is a rooted, directed acyclic graph G that can be associated
to a Boolean function f(x1, . . . , xn) by imposing a set of ordered, Boolean variables
x1 < . . . < xn and by reducing the graph [18]. Figure 2.3 is an example of a reducing
Boolean function f = x1 ∨ (x2 ∧ x3). Since 1990s, OBDD techniques applied to
model checking have been introduced in various papers [20, 80]. The model checking
using OBDD associates the set of states and the transition relation to two OBDDs
respectively. By comparing the two OBDDs it is possible to verify the formula. The
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Figure 2.3: OBDD Example for f = x1 ∨ (x2 ∧ x3)
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However, in probabilistic model checking, OBDDs are not suﬃcient to rep-
resent formulae and models because real-valued matrices and vectors are required.
Thus, MTBDDs (multi-terminal binary decision diagrams) [30] are useful supple-
ments. MTBDDs extend BDDs by allowing the representation of functions over
Boolean vectors that can take any value instead of only 0 or 1. Like BDDs, an
MTBDD is a directed acyclic graph. Figure 2.4 gives an example of an MTBDD over
four Boolean variables x1, x2, x3, and x4. In fact, if we take Boolean variables {x1, x2}
to range over row indices and {x3, x4} to range over column indices, the MTBDD in
Figure 2.4 represents the transition probability function P of the associated DTMC
is shown in Figure 2.1 (a)
2.5.3 SAT-Based Model Checking Algorithms
SAT-based model checking is a model checking technique that transform a model
checking problem into a problem of satisﬁability for propositional Boolean formulae
(SAT). The SAT-based model checking algorithm ﬁrst computes the satisfaction set
SAT (φ) of all stats satisfying φ recursively based on parse tree of φ: the nodes of
the formula φ parse tree represent the subformulae of φ. A state s |= φ if and only if
s ∈ SAT (φ). Table 2.4 shows the basic idea of this algorithm for CTL formula φ [5].
There are bounded model checking and unbounded model checking. Bounded
model checking is the ﬁrst step in applying SAT procedures to symbolic model check-
ing. It is based on the concept of bounded semantics. For Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) model M , given a formula ψ and a ﬁnite integer k, it can be proven that
M |= ψ if and only if there exists a ﬁnite integer k that formula ψ holds in M alone
with a path of length k. In [15], Biere et al. proved that bounded model checking
techniques can identify false formulae quicker than OBDD-based techniques if the
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Figure 2.4: An MTBDD Example Figure 2.1 (a) DTMC model
Table 2.4: Algorithm for Basic Idea of CTL Model Checking
Input:Transition system TS and formula φ
Output: “yes” or “no”
******(Compute the sets SAT (φ) = {s ∈ S|s |= φ}) ******
for all i ≤ |φ| do
for all ψ ∈ Sub(φ) with |ψ| = i do
compute SAT (ψ) from SAT (ψ′)
******for maximal genuine ψ′ ∈ Sub(ψ) ******
od
od






CTL by introducing ACTL, which restricts negation to atomic formulae only, and
permits universally quantiﬁed temporal operators only. A detailed presentation of
this approach can be found in [86].
A problem for the bounded model checking technique occurs when the bound
value k is high or when formulae are true in a model. In these cases, the performance
of an SAT-based technique decreases signiﬁcantly. In order to solve this problem,
McMillan present unbounded model checking in [81]. Unbounded model checking al-
gorithms are similar to symbolic model checking: instead of representing Boolean for-
mulae using OBDDs and comparing OBDDs, unbounded model checking algorithms
translate model checking formulae into a satisﬁable set for boolean formulae.
2.5.4 Probabilistic Model Checking Algorithms
Model checking techniques that we mentioned above only focus on the qualitative
properties that guarantee systems absolutely, (i.e, that a certain bad event will never
happen). In practice, however, many properties are not only important in terms of
correctness but also of measurable performance; and systems are subject to unreliable
and unpredictable behaviors as well. Therefore verifying quantitative properties are
as important as verifying qualitative properties. Probability is widely used in the
description and analysis of uncertain systems. Probabilistic model checking algorithms
are designed for calculating the likelihood of the occurrence of certain events during
the execution of the systems and checking both qualitative properties and quantitative
properties.
Courcoubetis and Yannakakis have proposed a probabilistic model checking al-
gorithm in [35, 36]. The models in probabilistic model checking algorithms are proba-
bilistic. The simplest probabilistic models are discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs),
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which are introduced in 2.1. In DTMCs, models are speciﬁed the probability of mak-
ing a transition from state s to a target state s′, where the probabilities of reaching
the target state from a given state must sum up to 1. PCTL introduced in 2.4 al-
lows us to express both qualitative and quantitative properties. We now illustrate the
probabilistic model checking algorithm for PCTL over DTMC.
The basic probabilistic model checking procedure is to compute the satisfaction
set SAT (φ), which is done recursively using a bottom-up traversal of the parse tree
of the formula φ. Computing the satisfaction set for the non-probabilistic operators
is performed in exactly the same way as for propositional model checking algorithms.
It is necessary to calculate the probability Prop(s) that a path leaving each state
s in order to compute SAT set for probabilistic operator. The probabilistic model
checking algorithms are ﬁrst presented in [35]. We use bounded until as an example
for computing the probabilistic SAT set in the following section.
To compute SAT (Prb[φ1 ∪
≤k φ2]), we ﬁrst compute SAT (φ1) and SAT (φ2).
Then we can identify the states that are for sure in the satisfaction set Syes =
SAT (φ2), and for sure not in the satisfaction set S
no = S \ (SAT (φ1) ∪ Sat(φ2)).
We also need to classify the uncertain states, which may or may not be in the sat-
isfaction set, S? = S \ (Syes ∪ Sno). After we divide the states, we can compute the





1, if s ∈ Syes
0, if s ∈ Sno
0, if s ∈ S? and k = 0
∑
s′∈W P (s, s
′) · Prob(s, φ1 ∪
≤k φ2), if s ∈ S
? and k > 0
For detail algorithms of probabilistic model checking can be found in [52, 84].
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2.6 Model Checking Tools
The techniques presented in Section 2.5 have been implemented in a number of model
checkers. Many of them are distributed under the GNU Public License. This section
brieﬂy summaries ﬁve free model checkering tools and their programming and speci-
ﬁcation languages. The following reviewed tools are chosen because each one of them
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Figure 2.5: MCMAS Overview
MCMAS [76], a model checker for MAS, was developed in University College
London. Its model checking algorithms are based on the Ordered Binary Decision
Diagrams symbolic model checking technique. Figure 2.5 shows the basic procedure
of MCMAS. The MCMAS program is based on a state-based formalism in which
the behavior is deﬁned by Kripke structures. This model checker can run on Linux,
Max OS X, and Windows using Cygwin and be added as an Eclipse plug-in for user
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graphical interface. MCMAS also is able to work interactive, step-by-step simulations.
It can verify the properties of CTL and CTLK.
In MCMAS, MAS models are described by the Interpreted Systems Program-
ming Language (ISPL), where the system can include two types of agents: an optional
environment agent, which is used to describe boundary conditions and infrastructures,
and standard agents. Each agent is composed of a set of local states, a set of actions,
rules that describe which action can be performed by an agent, and evolution func-
tions that describe how the local states of the agents evolve based on their current
local state and agents’ actions. ISPL can also be used to deﬁne atomic propositions,
action formulae and the speciﬁcation of properties to be checked. The highlight of
MCMAS is that it is able to check epistemic properties, such as Ki, CG, EG, etc.
The ﬁrst CTL model checker, EMC was announced by Clarke and Emerson in
[28]. Based on EMC, Clarke et al. [29] constituted the SMV (Symbolic Model Veriﬁer),
which is an eﬃcient CTL model checker based on a symbolic OBDD. NuSMV [27],
developed jointly by ITC-IRST and Carnegie Mellon University via re-implementing
and extending from SMV, is a software tool for the formal veriﬁcation of ﬁnite state
systems and the most widely cited model checker. It is based on symbolic model
checking techniques for CTL and bounded model checking techniques for LTL.
NuSMV is a model checker in which the input language is designed to allow the
description of ﬁnite state systems that range from completely synchronous to com-
pletely asynchronous. System models are translated into “MODULE”. The system
behavior is described in the module “main”. A set of states and variables is deﬁned
in the “VAR” section, and how these states and variables change is constructed in
“ASSIGN” section. Intended to describe ﬁnite state machines, the only data types
in the language are ﬁnite ones, i.e. boolean, scalar and ﬁxed arrays of basic data
types. This is suﬃcient because NuSMV models basically are intended to describe
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ﬁnite state machines. The verifying LTL and CTL speciﬁcations are also included in
the module. Besides batch mode, NuSMV also provides a textual interaction mode so
that users can activate various verifying steps. These steps can be invoked separately
and can track back.
PRISM [66], developed in the Computing Laboratory at the University of
Oxford, is a probabilistic symbolic model checker. It is a tool for formal model-
ing and analysis of systems which exhibit random or probabilistic behavior. Three
types of probabilistic models, discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs), continuous-time
Markov chains (CTMCs) and Markov decision processes (MDPs) can be speciﬁed in
the PRISM modeling language, which is a simple, state-based language. This lan-
guage is based on the Reactive Modules formalism of Alur and Henzinger [3]. It oﬀers
limited extensions of these models with costs and rewards. The property speciﬁcation
language incorporates the temporal logics PCTL, CSL, LTL and PCTL∗. Figure 2.6
shows the PRISM model checker procedure.
PRISM provides a Graph User Interface, which is implemented in Java. The
core algorithms are mainly developed in C++. For state space representation, PRISM
oﬀers a choice among MTBDDs, “sparse matrices” and“hybrid” data structures.
PRISM incorporates state-of-the art symbolic data structures and algorithms, based
on BDDs (Binary Decision Diagrams) and MTBDDs (Multi-Terminal Binary Deci-
sion Diagrams). It also features discrete-event simulation functionality for generating
approximate results for quantitative analysis.
MCK was developed at the School of Computer Science and Engineering at the
University of New South Wales for model checking the logic of knowledge. MCK sup-
ports various ways of deﬁning knowledge based on observations made by the agents:
observation alone, observation and clock, synchronous and asynchronous perfect re-
call of all observations. Speciﬁcations can be described as either linear or branching
37
time temporal operators with epistemic and mu-calculus operators. The MCK model
checker uses a concrete syntax designed to facilitate encoding of examples.
In MCK, MAS are modeled as a situation where agents interact in the context of
an environment. Every agent has its local states and is capable of performing certain
actions in the environment. Agents performs actions based on their protocol that
describes the allowable choices of the next action at each point of time. System states
include all environment states and agents’ local states. Properties are expressed with
speciﬁcation formulae.
CWBNC is an enhanced version of the Concurrency Workbench of the New
Century (CWB-NC) [33, 106]. It was developed by the Concurrency Workbench
project group. This model checker supports two diﬀerent temporal logics, the modal
mu-calculus and GCTL∗. It allows modeling concurrent systems using the process
algebra Calculus of Communicating Systems (.ccs), Synchronous Calculus of Com-
municating Systems (.sccs), and CCS with prioritized actions (.pccs), with timed
actions (.tccs). xCCS language is a paradigmatic process algebras language, which
is a prototype speciﬁcation language for reactive systems. For this reason, xCCS
language can be used not only to describe implementations of processes, but also
speciﬁcations of their expected behaviors.
In CWBNC, the speciﬁcations and formulas are ﬁrst “compiled” into automata,
then transformed into a type of deterministic automata. Therefore, this model checker
only can check a ﬁnite state machine containing less than 60,000 reachable states.



















Figure 2.6: PRISM Overview
Table 2.5: Comparison of Model Checkers
Model Model checking System model Properties platform
checker techniques language language
MCMAS OBDD ISPL CTL Window (Cygwin),
CTLK Linux, Mac OS.
NuSMV BDD − based .smv LTL Window
SAT − based CTL
PRISM BDD DTMC PCTL PCTL∗ Window (Cygwin),
MTBDD CTMD CSL, LTL Linux, Mac OS.
MDP
MCK OBDD .mck a combination of Linux
bounded CTL* with epistemic and
model checking mu-calculus operators







Our work mainly involves three areas of research: 1) a framework for representing
probabilistic-epistemic systems; 2) logics for expressing probabilistic-epistemic prop-
erties; and 3) approaches for model checking probabilistic-epistemic properties. In the
rest of this section, we will compare our work with other researchers’ work in these
relevant areas.
3.1 Models
One main framework for representing epistemic systems is with interpreted systems
formalism [45]. Reasoning about knowledge and time with interpreted system formal-
ism is thoroughly investigated and extensively used in specifying and verifying MAS
[34, 75, 85, 95]. With interpreted systems formalism, we can easily develop various
epistemic modalities based on diﬀerent agents’ accessibility relations. For illustration,
with agent epistemic accessibility relations, a knowledge modality is introduced to
represent an individual agent’s knowledge; while with a group of agents’ epistemic
accessibility relations, we can deﬁne distributed knowledge in the group. Recently,
some researchers have enriched interpreted systems with probability in order to specify
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uncertain agent systems [50, 56, 57, 102].
Most work on interpreted system frameworks only focus on epistemic systems
[9, 34, 77, 75, 85, 95], while uncertainty of knowledge is not considered. Belardineli and
Lomuscio ﬁrst investigated extending interpreted systems into the ﬁrst order logic in
[8]. They deﬁned quantiﬁed interpreted systems (QIS) to enable the use of quantiﬁers
on epistemic models by endowing each structure with a domain of individuals within
a ﬁrst-order temporal epistemic logic. However, in their proposal, the stochastic
behavior of agents and probabilistic properties are not considered. Also, the ﬁrst order
logic is not very expressive; for example, there is no ﬁrst-order sentence that deﬁnes
the ﬁnite structures, which are widely used in the model checking area. Another
drawback for the QIS is that the decidability has not been studied yet.
Researchers in [56, 57] have integrated interpreted systems with partial obser-
vation techniques to express stochastic epistemic systems. The Partially Observable
Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) [23] provides another framework for reasoning
about knowledge and are mainly used to represent uncertain knowledge of agents.
POMDPs are a generalization of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and have been
used to model the incomplete/uncertain knowledge and behavior for stochastic agents
since the 1990s [23, 48, 61]. In the past decade, POMDPs have been extended into
self-learning and reaction areas, such as machine learning [4, 89], robotic applications
[63, 92], etc. In the POMDP-based framework, agents only partially observe the un-
derlying states and maintain a probability distribution over the set of belief states.
Belief states are computed based on a set of observations.
Both Huang and his colleagues [56, 57] and our work are based on interpreted
systems. Unlike our work that integrates interpreted systems into Markov chains,
Huang el al. proposed interpreted partially observed discrete-time Markov chains
(PO-DTMCs) in [56]. PO-DTMCs are generalized from POMDPs with deterministic
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choice of actions. This approach is based on partial observations with assumption of
synchronous with perfect recall. In their method, the environment is a special agent
that includes the set of states. Other agents observe the environment and perform
actions based on their observations. Every agent, including the environment agent,
has its own probability transition function for each accessible state based on its ac-
cessibility relations (the environment agent’s transition function will be the system
probability transition function). Probabilistic knowledge is expressed by a rational
linear combination of every agents’ probabilities in the system. The main problem is
that the probabilities associated with accessible states are not part of the system, but
part of the agents’ programs and it is not clear how an agent obtains those probabil-
ities. Practically, an agent can see which state is equivalent to or indistinguishable
from the current state, but it is hard to see by how much the state is indistinguishable.
Nevertheless, probabilistic knowledge in our approach is captured in a simpler and
more practical way as a direct and inherent extension of non-probabilistic knowledge
where the probability only depends on the number of equivalent states, as all the
states are equally accessible.
These two frameworks both have advantages and disadvantages. Interpreted
systems are widely used in modeling epistemic systems without uncertainty because
interpreted systems provide a natural and elegant way of capturing the philosophical
foundations of knowledge using a possible and accessible world. The speciﬁcation of
uncertain knowledge of MAS with interpreted systems is, however, still in an early
stage of research. On the other hand, POMDPs, based on Markov Decision Processes,
manipulate uncertainty intrinsically. POMDPs have been widely studied in artiﬁcial
intelligence to discover optimal strategies that can be taken by an agent. Nevertheless,
a POMDP models the relationship between an agent and its environment. POMDPs
have been used in single agent systems mainly to ﬁnd the best solution or strategy for
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the agent. The algorithm for solving POMDP runs in exponential time in the size of
the model’s actions and observations. Furthermore, the dimensionality of the belief
space grows with the number of states. In [102], we previously compared our work
based on interpreted systems modeling with Huang et al.’s work [56] based on PO-
DTMC modeling. The results show that our method performs better than Huang’s
in verifying the example protocol (see Chapter 4).
Besides those two main frameworks for representing and reasoning about epis-
temic systems, Delgado and Benevides in [39] specify each individual agent in MAS by
a homogeneous DTMC with synchronization actions. In their special DTMC model,
a state either has a synchronized action with probability 1 to represent agent behav-
ior or regular probabilistic transitions. Agents collaborate with these synchronization
actions. Then they formalize the composition of two DTMCs, a DTMC with regular
probabilistic transitions and a DTMC with agents’ synchronized actions, in a MDP
to represent the behavior of the overall MAS. The drawback of this method is that it
limits the agents’ behavior by unifying all agents actions into one DTMC structure. In
addition, only using global states for overall MAS constraints inﬂuences every agent’s
behavior.
3.2 Logics
Logics of probability and knowledge are highly related to our research. Both epis-
temic logic and probabilistic logic are multimodal logics that combine two types of
modalities. Computation Tree logic of Knowledge (CTLK), proposed by Penczek and
Lomuscio in [85], extends from CTL (introduced by Emerosn and Clarke in [44]) by
adding epistemic modalities and is used in many MAS to specify epistemic proper-
ties. CTLK formulae are associated with interpreted systems. The basic temporal
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modalities are deﬁned as usual, while epistemic modalities are based on epistemic
accessibility relations similar to our deﬁnitions. They also developed an OBDD-based
symbolic model checker MCMAS [78] that can verify agents’ knowledge in MAS. Mey-
den et al. in [95] deﬁne a language for reasoning knowledge and time in systems with
perfect recall. Their language is applicable to interpreted systems as well. Unlike
CTLK that extends the branching time logic CTL, their language is based on linear
time. MCK [47] is designed for verifying epistemic properties of MAS and supports
several diﬀerent ways of deﬁning agents’ knowledge, such as using observation alone
or observation and clock with either synchronous or asynchronous perfect recall of all
the observations. Both CTLK and language presented by Meyden et al., however,
do not consider probabilistic behaviors. Therefore, these languages cannot express
agents’ uncertain knowledge.
On the other hand, Probabilistic logics include probabilistic modalities and tem-
poral modalities. This kind of logic has been used with Markov chains (determinism)
or Markov Decision Processes (nondeterminism). Hansson and Jonsson in [52] have
put forward probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL) which focuses only on non-
epistemic probabilistic properties. Path quantiﬁers ∃ and ∀ are not valid in PCTL
formulae. However, Baier and Kwiatkowska proposed a probabilistic branching time
logic PBTL which allows path quantiﬁers to verify probability with fairness constraints
in [7]. The quantiﬁers ∃ and ∀ in PBTL range over the adversaries; thus, these quan-
tiﬁers are only involved in deterministic choices. Another probabilistic logic exam-
ple comes from Jamroga in [59], Markov temporal logic MTLx, an extension of the
“Discounted CTL” (DCTL), which uses a discount factor to achieve the probabilis-
tic factor. He introduced MTL0 for Markov chains and MTL1 for Markov Decision
Processes. MTLx(x ∈ {0, 1}) allows agents to perform ﬂexible reasoning about their
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outcomes in stochastic environments. Unlike other probabilistic logic using probabilis-
tic transition functions to present probabilistic choices, Jamorga uses utility ﬂuent to
present the truth values for Markov chains and MDPs. The probabilistic logics men-
tioned in this paragraph only focus on quantitative or probabilistic properties not on
the epistemic ones. Consequently, neither epistemic logics nor probabilistic logics are
suitable for uncertain knowledge of MAS.
Dealing with uncertainty or incompleteness within distributed knowledge bases
has been recently addressed by some researchers in [22, 39, 56, 57, 107]. Logics that
they proposed are more or less similar to our logic, but our logic is more expressive and
better suited to epistemic-probabilistic systems. Huang el al. put forward Alternating-
Time Temporal Logic (PATL*) in [56] to account for incomplete information in multi-
players synchronous games. The syntax of this logic is as follows:
φ ::= p| ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | Xφ | φ1Uφ2 |〈〈A〉〉
dφ
where p is an atomic proposition, and A ⊆ Agt = {1, . . . , n} is a player, d is a rational
constant in [0, 1], and  is a relation symbol in the set {≤, <,≥, >}. The only diﬀer-
ence from regular temporal logic formula is 〈〈A〉〉dφ, which expresses that players in
A can collaborate to enforce the fact φ with a probability in relation  with constant
d. The semantics of this logic is associated with probabilistic interpreted systems and
uses partially observed probabilistic concurrent game structure where players have
perfect recall memory over observations. The logic oﬀers the ability to reason about
strategies on incomplete information over games involving multiple players. The pa-
per proves that the model checking problem of PATL* is in general undecidable, which
precludes the use of this logic to verify scalable concrete applications.
Delgado and Benevides[39] modeled MAS using DTMC with synchronization
actions and deﬁned K-PCTL logic to specify the properties. K-PCTL, an epistemic
extension of the probabilistic CTL temporal logic, allows epistemic and temporal
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properties as well as likelihoods of events. The syntax of K-PCTL is as follows:
φ ::= true| a | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Prel p[ψ] | Kiφ | CGφ | EGφ
ψ ::= φ | φU≤kφ | φUφ
where a is an atomic proposition, rel ∈ {≤, <,≥, >}, p ∈ [0, 1], i is an agent in the
system, and k ∈ N. As shown in the syntax, K-PCTL can only express probabilities
over path formulae; therefore, K-PCTL is not able to specify the uncertainty of the
knowledge. Our PCTLK logic overcomes this limitation by allowing probabilities over
knowledge operators (for simpliﬁcations, we omit group knowledge operators which
include in the previous paper [102] ). Thus, our logic is more expressive than K-
PCTL because our PCTLK logic not only expresses probabilities on path formulae,
but also includes probabilities of knowledge. The semantics of this logic is associated
with MDP models augmented with the accessibility relations so that probabilities
over paths can be deﬁned and classic knowledge formula can be captured. However,
probabilities of knowing cannot be captured because accessibility transitions are not
probabilistic. Our approach surmounted this drawback by integrating probabilistic
interpreted systems into Markov chains. Accessibility transitions are quantiﬁed during
the integration so that they are probabilistic.
In contrast to K-PCTL, which focuses only on probability in path formulae,
Cao in [22] proposed a probabilistic epistemic temporal logic, called PETL, which
only includes probability of knowledge modalities but not of temporal modalities.





Γφ (see [22] for syntax deﬁnition details). K
p
aφ means that
agent a knows the probability of φ is greater than or equal to p. EpΓφ and C
p
Γφ are
group epistemic formulae which express that every agent in Γ knows the probability
of φ is greater than or equal to p and “the probability of φ is greater than or equal
to p” is common knowledge by every agent in Γ. The main drawback for PETL is
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that it cannot express properties like “in the future φ holds in p probability” and “the
probability that an agent knows φ is p”. In our PCTLK logic, probabilities can be
expressed over the whole formula, which allows us to state these properties. That
is, PCTLK can express both probability of paths (probability over the next, until,
and global operators) and the probability of knowing, which is on top of properties
about knowing the probability of formulae that PETL can express. Furthermore,
PETL is based on LTL, while our logic is an extension of CTL. LTL and CTL are
incomparable in terms of expressiveness, which means one cannot be a subset of the
other. The semantics of PETL is associated with a probabilistic epistemic temporal
model that includes the set of the global states, a total binary (successor) relation on
global states, epistemic accessibility relations, a probability function for every agent,
and a valuation function that assigns to each state a set of propositional variables that
are assumed to be true at the state. The semantics of probabilistic knowledge is then
deﬁned using the probability function that is associated to each accessibility transition.
The main diﬃculty with this deﬁnition is the computation of those probabilities over
accessibility transitions, which are not part of the system being checked, but rather
part of the agent’s accessibility relations. It is not clear how to deﬁne or compute
these probabilities. In our semantics, however, we assume that all the accessible
states from a given state are equally accessible. Thus, accessibility transitions are not
probabilistic. Nevertheless, probabilistic knowledge is naturally deﬁned by computing
the number of accessible states that satisfy the knowledge over the total number of
accessible states.
Zhao et al. extended this logic to consider probabilistic aspects of systems and
introduced the probabilistic temporal logic of knowledge called PTLK in [107]. PTLK
can expresses probability on both path formulae and epistemic formulae. To express
probability of path, PTLK modiﬁed PETL formulae “next” (©φ) and “until” (φUφ)
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asXpφ and φUpφ respectively, where  ∈ {>,≥, <,≤,=}, p ∈ [0, 1] is a real number.
However, PTLK still cannot specify “the probability that an agent knows φ is p”. Also
the probabilistic Kripke structure (PK), which is associated with PTLK semantics,
is very similar to a probabilistic epistemic temporal model: they use the probability
function associated with each accessibility transition to deﬁne probabilistic knowledge,
as in PETL. Therefore, PTLK still has the same drawback as PETL.
There is a new trend that uses combinations of logics [64] to express many
aspects of MAS, such as knowledge and time, knowledge and probability, real-time and
knowledge, etc., to avoid repeating the implementation of many diﬀerent veriﬁcation
systems. The component logics refer to key aspects of MAS, including classic temporal
logics (CTL, LTL, etc.), belief/knowledge logics (model logics KD45, S5, etc.), logics
of goals (modal logics KD, etc.), probabilistic temporal logics (PCTL, etc.), and real-
time temporal logics (TCTL, etc.). The component logics can be combined in three
ways:
1. Temporalisation, which adds a temporal dimension to another logic system;
2. Fusion (independent join), which is obtained by the union of the respective sets
of connectives and the union of the formation rules of both logics [46]; and
3. Product (join), which produces higher-dimensional temporal logics by combining
lower-dimensional temporal logics.
With these three combination methods, the syntax of combinations of logics is possible
to cover all aspects of MAS. In their paper, Konur et al. provide a generic model
checking algorithm, which synthesizes a combined model checker from the model
checkers of simpler component logics. The authors do not clearly explain, however,
how the semantics of those combined logics are associated with models. This issue
aﬀects the future implementation. Therefore, the realistic application of combinations
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of logics still needs to be demonstrated. In short, combinations of logics still needs to
be explored further.
3.3 Model Checking Approaches
Many model checking techniques have been developed to overcome the state explosion
problem of model checking, such as symbolic techniques [19], reduction techniques
[31], bounded model checking [14], etc. In order to use the existing probability model
checker PRISM, we exploit reduction techniques to reduce model checking PCTLK
to model checking PCTL. The foundation for reduction techniques is that a formula
is true in the abstract system, if and only if (iﬀ) it is true in the original system [31].
In addition to our method that transforms models and formulae into widely used
models and formulae, there are also other reduction techniques, such as probabilistic
abstraction techniques [107], approximate probabilistic techniques [54], and symmetry
reduction techniques [34].
He´rault et al. in [54] presented a randomized algorithm that allows the eﬃcient
approximation of the satisfaction probability of monotone properties on probabilistic
systems. They developed an approximate probabilistic model checker APMC to im-
plement their method in [54]. The essentially positive fragment (EPF) of LTL was
deﬁned to express only monotone properties, which means a formula φ holds in a
path σ if and only if the formula φ holds in any path σ+ of which σ is a preﬁx. Then
they denote Prob[ψ] as the measure of the set of paths in the probabilistic transition
system. They generate random paths in the probabilistic space underlying the DTMC
structure of depth k and compute a random variable which estimates Prob[ψ]. They
have used this approach to verify extremely large systems such as the Pnueli and
Zuch’s 500 dining philosophers. This approach however, can be used only on EPF of
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LTL and does not work with epistemic properties.
Zhou et al. introduced the logic PTLK (probabilistic temporal logic of knowl-
edge) and proposed an abstraction procedure for model checking PTLK in [107]. Their
abstraction approach is based on partitioning the state space into several equivalence
classes which consist of the set of abstract states. After partition, the probability
distribution between these partitions is an interval. Every formula will correspond to
a probability function over the interval. However, no experiments were implemented
to show the reduction rate of their approach.
Cohen et al. used a symmetry reduction technique to verify temporal-epistemic
logic CTLK in [34]. Only agent symmetries were considered. By permuting agent
names along the epistemic accessibility relation, they reduced the interpreted systems
semantics into a counterpart semantics. The approach exploited agent symmetries to
reduce the initial states. Therefore, after reduction, there is a single representative for
a group of symmetric initial states. The experimental results with the muddy children
show signiﬁcant reductions in veriﬁcation time and states. However, uncertainty has
not been considered. In future work, we intend to explore the extension of this method
to the probabilistic model checking ﬁeld.
There are model checking tools designed for the veriﬁcation of epistemic and
temporal properties of MAS, for example MCK [47], and MCMAS [78]. MCK sup-
ports agents’ knowledge in both observation alone and observation with clock for
synchronous or asynchronous perfect recall of all the observations. It can be used to
verify either linear or branching time temporal logics. while MCMAS only supports
branching temporal logic and CTLK. There are also some model checkers developed
for verifting probabilistic speciﬁcations, like PRISM [69] and ProbVerus [53]. PRISM
is a probabilistic symbolic model checker that can verify PCTL, CSL, LTL and PCTL*
50
formulae, as well as extensions for quantitative speciﬁcations and costs/rewards for-
mulae. ProbVerus is an extension of Verus [21], which combines symbolic model
checking techniques and quantitative algorithms for computing minimum and maxi-
mum time delay between two events. ProbVerus can be used to verify PCTL formulae
on fully probabilistic systems. However, there are no model checking tools speciﬁcally
for epistemic-probabilistic properties. We used the reduction technique to convert
probabilistic-epistemic properties into quantitative properties so that we are able to





This chapter is mainly from the paper published in Knowledge-based systems [102].
In Section 4.1, which answers our ﬁrst research question, we present the models and
introduce probabilistic interpreted systems. We deﬁne a new logic PCTLK in Section
4.2 to answer our research question 2 and state syntax and semantics of PCTLK.
Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 provide answers for research questions 3 and 4. In Section
4.3, we explain how model checking PCTLK can be reduced to model checking PCTL.
We implement our approach with PRISM [66] and apply it to a case study in Section
4.4.
4.1 Probabilistic Interpreted Systems
Let A = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n agents in the system. Every agent i ∈ A is associated
with its local state set Li, and possible actions set Acti. A set of global states Γ ⊆
L1 × . . . × Ln is the set of all possible tuples (l1, . . . , ln), and each tuple represents
a computational state for the whole system. If we assume that all actions have even
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chance, we can map actions to the probabilistic transition function T for the system.
T is deﬁned as T : Γ × Act × Γ → [0, 1], where Act ⊆ Act1 × . . . × Actn is the
set of actions that are executed by agents in the system for collaboration, such that
for every global state γ ∈ Γ,
∑
γ′∈Γ T (γ, α
γγ′ , γ′) = 1, where αγγ
′
∈ Act is the action
labeling the transition from γ to γ′. Each agent is associated with a local probabilistic







i , l′i) = 1 for i ∈ A, where α
lil
′
i ∈ Acti is the agent i’s action labeling
the transition from li to l
′
i. For li ∈ γ, l
′
i ∈ γ
′, the probabilistic transition function T
for the system can be calculated by Equation 4.1 as follows:
T (γ, αγγ
′










i , l′i) (4.1)
where η is a normalizing factor that forces transitions ﬁt for probability distribution∑
γ′∈Γ t(γ, α
γγ′ , γ′) = 1 for every global state γ. A global initial distribution Iinit
expresses how the system starts and satisﬁes
∑
γ∈Γ Iinit(γ) = 1. Deﬁnition 4.1 deﬁnes
the formal models of PCTLK MPIS.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Models MPIS of PCTLK
Over a set of atomic propositions AP , a modelMPIS is a tuple: MPIS = (W,Pt, Iinit,∼1
, . . . ,∼n, V ) where:
• W ⊆ Γ is the set of reachable states. A state w is reachable if and only if there
exists a sequence of transitions from an initial state to w such that all of the
transitions have probability greater than 0.




• Pt : W ×W → [0, 1] is the transition probability function deﬁned by Pt(w,w
′) =
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p (p ∈ [0, 1]) if and only if there exists a collaboration action (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Act
such that
∑
i∈A Ti(w, ai, w
′) > 0 and the value of Pt is equal to t(w, α
ww′ , w) in




• ∼i⊆ W ×W is the epistemic accessibility relation for the agent i, such that for
two global states (l1, . . . , ln) and (l
′
1, . . . , l
′
n), we have: (l1, . . . , ln) ∼i (l
′
1, . . . , l
′
n)
iﬀ li = l
′
i.
• V is a global state labeling function V : W → 2AP .
The initial distribution Iinit can be viewed as a column vector of |S| rows where
|S| is the cardinality of S (Iinit(s))s∈S, in which the value of every row represents the
probability that the corresponding state is an initial state.
The transition probability function Pt : W ×W → [0, 1] can be represented by
the matrix (Pt(s, t))s,t∈W . The probabilities of moving from state s to its successors
are shown on the rows Pt(s, .) of the matrix, while the probabilities of entering state































Figure 4.1: Model MPIS
Let us consider the example illustrated in Fig 4.1 showing an MIPS model
where two agents are included. W = {s0, s1, s2, s3, s4} is the set of reachable states.
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AP = {p, q}. The labeling function V is: V (s0) = {q}, V (s1) = {∅}, V (s2) = {p, q},
V (s3) = {q}, and V (s4) = {p}. For epistemic accessibility relations, we have:
{(s0, s0), (s0, s1), (s0, s2), (s1, s0), (s2, s0), (s1, s1), (s2, s2), (s3, s3), (s4, s4)} ⊆∼1 and
{(s0, s0), (s0, s2), (s0, s3), (s2, s0), (s3, s0), (s1, s1), (s2, s2), (s3, s3), (s4, s4)} ⊆∼2
The initial distribution Iinit and the transition probability function Pt viewed as a
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Speciﬁcations for interpreted DTMC modelsMPIS can be expressed in PCTLK (Prob-
abilistic Computation Tree Logic of Knowledge), which combines CTL logic [32], epis-
temic logic [45], and probabilistic logic [6, 52]. PCTLK can be used to reason about
probabilistic knowledge and specify properties of probabilistic-epistemic MAS.
A PCTLK formula is capable of formulating conditions on a state of an epis-
temic Markov chain. Besides the standard propositional logic operators, PCTLK also
includes the probabilistic operator Pr. Unlike standard CTL, path quantiﬁers ∃ and
∀ are not valid in PCTLK formulae, all path formulae are immediately preceded by
the probabilistic operator Pr.
55
4.2.1 Syntax of PCTLK
PCTLK is comprised of three types of formulae: state formulae φ, path formulae
ψ, and epistemic formulae κ. State and path formulae of CTL are state and path
formulae of PCTLK. Epistemic formulae are expressed using knowledge and group
knowledge operators. The syntax of PCTLK is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.2. Syntax of PCTLK
Let p, p1, p2, . . . range over the set of atomic propositions Φp. Let A = {1, . . . , n} be
a set of agents and G ⊆ A be a group of agents, the PCTLK formulae are deﬁned by
the following BNF grammar:
φ ::= true | p | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | κ | Prb(ψ) | Prb(κ)
ψ ::= ©φ | φ U≤n φ | φ U φ
κ ::= Kiφ | EGφ | CGφ | DGφ
where 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 is a real number giving the rational boundary,  ∈ {<,≤,≥, >}
presents relationship boundary of the probability, and n ∈ N is the maximum steps to
achieve a speciﬁc state.
Formulae κ, called epistemic formulae, are special state formulae in PCTLK
that can describe epistemic properties. There are four epistemic modalities: Ki, EG,
CG, and DG that represent respectively “agent i knows”, “every agent in the group
G knows”, “common knowledge in the group G”, and “distributed knowledge in the
group G”. Prb(Kiφ) represents the probability that agent i knows φ, where φ is
a state formula. This probability is b. KiPrbψ states that agent i knows the
probability that the path formula ψ holds, which is b. b indicates a lower or upper
bound on the probability (e.g < b, ≤ b, ≥ b, or > b). The diﬀerence between these
two kinds of formulae is that Prb(Kiφ) expresses the degree of agent i knowing
something, while KiPrbψ indicates that agent i knows some uncertain things. To
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illustrate, Pr≥0.9(K1φ) indicates that agent 1 knows φ with at least 0.9 probability.
K1(Pr≥0.9φ) means agent 1 knows that with at least 0.9 probability, φ holds. ♦φ
and φ are the usual abbreviations for eventually and globally: ♦φ ≡ true U φ and
φ ≡ ¬♦¬φ.
There are no universal (∀) and existential (∃) path quantiﬁers in PCTLK. In-
stead, the linear temporal operators © (next), U (until), and U≤n (bounded until)
are required to follow the probabilistic operator Prb immediately. The propositional
temporal fragment of PCTLK has the same meaning as in CTL. For example, the
formula ©φ has the meaning of “in the next state φ holds”. φ1Uφ2 means “φ1 holds
until φ2”. A new step-bounded variant of until (φ1U
≤nφ2) is added, meaning that
“φ2 will hold within at most n steps while φ1 holds in all states before a φ2-state has
been reached”. The step-bounded until is necessary in probabilistic logic because the
probability of reaching a φ2-state after at most n steps is diﬀerent from reaching this
state after at most (n+ 1) steps. In CTL, temporal operators © and U are required
to be immediately preceded by a path quantiﬁer, while in PCTLK, they must follow
the operator Prb immediately.
The probabilistic operator on path formulae Prb(ψ) expresses that “ψ holds
with a probability b”. For instance, Pr≥0.75(©message receive) asserts that “with
at least 0.75 probability, in the next state the message will be received”. The prob-
abilistic operator on epistemic formulae Prb(κ) states the degree of the knowledge:
how much the agent is conﬁdent about his knowledge. For example, the following
formula: Pr≤0.8(K1(agent 2 has resource A)) expresses that agent 1 knows with a
maximum probability of 0.8 that agent 2 has resource A. More speciﬁcally, this means
that out of X accessible states for agent 1, Y states satisfy the fact that agent 2 has
resource A, where Y/X ≤ 0.8.
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4.2.2 PCTLK Semantics for DTMC
Before we give the formal semantics of PCTLK, we brieﬂy review the notion of prob-
ability space [40] and then deﬁne group epistemic relations. A probability space is a
mathematical constructor in probability theory. It is expressed as a triple (Ω, E ,P)
that models a process consisting of events that occur randomly.
• Ω is a sample space. To ﬁt our case, we assume that Ω is a set of states.
• E is a set of events. E is a subset of Ω. If E ⊆ Ω, then E = Ω− E ⊆ Ω;
• P : E → [0, 1] is a function, also called a probability measure that assigns
probabilities to events. The measure of the whole sample space P(Ω) = 1. If
E1 ⊆ Ω, E2 ⊆ Ω, and E1 ∩ E2 = ∅, then P(E1 ∪ E2) = P(E1) + P(E2).
The probabilistic operator Prb can be placed either in front of a path formula ψ
or in front of an epistemic formula κ. Formulae are evaluated on states or along paths
where a path is an inﬁnite sequence of states. For the formula Prb(ψ), s |= Prb(ψ)
means that “the probability from state s that ψ holds for all outgoing paths is b”.
For example, s |= Pr<0.25(true ∪
≤5 φ) asserts that “the probability that the system
model satisﬁes φ within 5 steps of all outgoing paths from the state s is less than
0.25”. We use the symbol Prob to stand for the probability measure. In order to
compute the probability measure of a path, we need to associate a probability space
with probabilities in the model MPIS. Let π̂ = s0 . . . sm be a ﬁnite fragment of the
path π, the cylinder set Cyl(π̂) [6] is the set of all inﬁnite reachable paths emanating
from π̂ inMPIS. The probability measure of this cylinder set Cyl(π̂) can be calculated
by:
Prob(Cyl(π̂)) = Prob(Cyl(s0 . . . sm)) = Iinit(s0) ·Pt(s0 . . . sm) (4.2)
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where:




For model checking purposes, Equation 4.2 will be used when we are interested
in determining if the model satisﬁes a given formula. However, when the question is
about determining if a given state s satisﬁes a given formula, we assume that s is the
unique initial state, so that we use Is instead of Iinit to compute Prob(Cyl(π̂)). The




1, if s = t
0, otherwise
(4.4)
LetG ⊆ A be a group of agents. To deﬁne the semantics of the epistemic operators EG,
CG, andDG, we deﬁne the group epistemic accessibility relations from the accessibility
relation ∼i as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.3. Group Epistemic Accessibility Relations
• ∼EG is the union of group G
′s accessibility relations: ∼EG=
⋃
i∈G ∼i.
• ∼CG is the transitive closure of ∼
E
G.
• ∼DG is the intersection of G
′s accessibility relations: ∼DG=
⋂
i∈G ∼i.
For the state formula Prb(κ), s |= Prb(κ) means that “on state s, the prob-
ability that the epistemic formula κ holds is b ”. We denote the number of states
s′ such that for a given state s we have s ∼i s
′ for agent i (i ∈ A) by |s ∼i s
′|. The
sample space of agent i at state s is the set of possible worlds or equivalent states of
i at s and is equal to |s ∼i s
′|. Similarly, we denote the number of states s′ that are
accessible from a given state s through ∼EG by |s ∼
E
G s





through ∼DG by |s ∼
D
G s
′|. We also deﬁne |s |= φ| as follows:
|s |= φ| =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1, if s |= φ
0, otherwise
(4.5)
Let s ∈ W be a state, π = s0, s1, s2, . . . a path, i.e. an inﬁnite sequence of states
related by transitions, a ∈ AP an atomic proposition, φ a PCTLK state formula
(i.e. evaluated over states), and ψ a PCTLK path formula (i.e. evaluated through
paths). The (i + 1)th state in π is denoted by π(i) (i.e., π(i) = si). σ(s) is the set
of all paths emanating from s. Given the model MPIS = (W,Pt, Iinit,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ),
(MPIS, s) |= φ stands for “state s satisﬁes φ in the system model MPIS” or “φ is true
at state s in the system model MPIS”. (MPIS, π) |= ψ is read as “the path π satisﬁes
ψ in the system model MPIS” or “ψ is true through the path π in the system model
MPIS”. If MPIS is clear from the context, we simply write s |= φ and π |= ψ. In the
following, we deﬁne the semantics of PCTLK.
• For a state s:
s |= a iﬀ a ∈ V (s)
s |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iﬀ s |= φ1 and s |= φ2
s |= ¬φ iﬀ s  φ
The semantics of the state formulae Prb(ψ) and Prb(κ) will be given later.
• For a path π:
π |= ©φ iﬀ π(1) |= φ
π |= φ1U
≤nφ2 iﬀ ∃0 ≤ k ≤ n, π(k) |= φ2 and ∀0 ≤ i < k π(i) |= φ1
π |= φ1 Uφ2 iﬀ ∃k ≥ 0, π(k) |= φ2 and ∀0 ≤ i < k π(i) |= φ1
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• The semantics of epistemic formulae κ over a state s is based on the epistemic
accessibility relation and group epistemic accessibility relations as given in Def-
inition 4.3:
s |= Kiφ iﬀ ∀s
′ ∈ W if s ∼i s
′ then s′ |= φ
s |= EGφ iﬀ ∀s
′ ∈ W if s ∼EG s
′ then s′ |= φ
s |= CGφ iﬀ ∀s
′ ∈ W if s ∼CG s
′ then s′ |= φ
s |= DGφ iﬀ ∀s
′ ∈ W if s ∼DG s
′ then s′ |= φ
• In terms of probability space, the set of all reachable states from the initial
states is our sample space Ω and for each formula, the set of states satisfying
it is the set of events E . Based on this observation, we deﬁne the semantics of
the probabilistic operator Pr that works on path and epistemic formulae in the
following.
– For a probabilistic operator working on a path formula, where π̂ = s0 . . . sm:

















Prob(Cyl(π̂)), if sm|=φ2, 0<m≤n,and ∀0≤i<m, si|=φ1
0, otherwise
(4.7)
s |= Prb(φ1Uφ2) iﬀ Prob(s, σ(s), φ1Uφ2) b, where:
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Prob(s, σ(s), φ1Uφ2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩




Prob(Cyl(π̂)), if sm|=φ2 and∀0≤i<m, si|=φ1
0, otherwise
(4.8)
– For a probabilistic operator working on an epistemic formula:
s |= Prb(Kiφ) iﬀ Prob(s |= Kiφ) b, where:






s |= Prb(EGφ) iﬀ Prob(s |= EGφ) b, where:









s |= Prb(CGφ) iﬀ Prob(s |= CGφ) b, where:









s |= Prb(DGφ) iﬀ Prob(s |= Dκφ) b, where:









Example 4.1. In this example, we will illustrate how to check if a state satisﬁes a
probabilistic formula using Figure 4.2 that shows a simple MPIS model. The solid lines
with numbers are probabilistic transitions. The dash lines are epistemic accessibility
relations ∼1 for agent 1. To keep the example simple, only ∼1 from s0 are shown in
































Figure 4.2: An Example of MPIS Model
We want to check if state s0 satisﬁes the formula Pr>0.9(♦p). To do so, we have
to compute the probability of all paths from s0 that satisfy ♦p ≡ true U p, and then
check if the summation of these probabilities is greater than 0.9 (see Equations 4.2,
4.3, and 4.8). We have:
Prob(s0, σ(s0), true U p) = Pt(s0, s1) +Pt(s0, s0)×Pt(s0, s1)




(1/2)n = 1 > 0.9
Consequently, state s0 satisﬁes this formula.
Let us now check, for example, if s0 satisﬁes Pr>0.7(K1q). We use Equation 4.9
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to compute the probability Prob(s0 |= K1q). Since the number of accessible states
from s0 using ∼1 is 3, out of which 2 satisfy q, we obtain:
Prob(s0 |= K1q) = 2/3 < 0.7








































Figure 4.3: Another Example of MPIS Model
Example 4.2. Let us consider another example mainly for probabilistic epistemic
operators using Figure 4.3 that illustrates another MPIS model where two agents are
considered. For the sake of simplicity, only the accessibility relations from state s0
are shown in the ﬁgure and one from s2 needed to show ∼
C
G. Furthermore, the ones
that can be deduced from the properties of the accessibility relation (for instance tran-
sitivity and Euclideanity) are omitted. We also omit the probabilities of transitions.
Let G be the group of agents 1 and 2. So, for the union of ∼1 and ∼2 we have:
{(s0, s0), (s0, s1), (s0, s2), (s0, s3)} ⊆∼
E
G; for the transitive closure of ∼
E
G, we have:
{(s0, s0), (s0, s1), (s0, s2), (s0, s3), (s0, s4)} ⊆∼
C
G; and for the intersection of ∼1 and
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∼2 we have: {(s0, s0), (s0, s2)} ⊆∼
D
G .
Now, we use semantics equations to calculate the probability of epistemic oper-
ators.




































Thus, for instance, we have s0 satisﬁes the formula Pr≥0.6(CGq), but does not satisfy
Pr≥0.7(CGq).
4.2.3 Properties of Probabilistic Knowledge
PCTLK inherits epistemic properties from CTLK [74] and probabilistic properties
of path formulae from PCTL [6]. We list a number of new properties that are not
included in conventional epistemic and probabilistic logics. For the conventional ones,
please refer to [6, 45].
There are a number of equivalences between a probabilistic epistemic formula
and the conventional knowledge formula. If the probability that an agent knows φ is
greater than or equal to 1 holds at state s, then the agent knows φ holds at the state
s. We can expand this validity to everyone’s knowledge EGφ, common knowledge
CGφ, and distributed knowledge DGφ.
Theorem 4.1. Probabilistic and Epistemic Equivalence
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s |= Pr≥1(Kiφ) iff s |= Kiφ s |= Pr<1(Kiφ) iff s |= ¬Kiφ
s |= Pr≥1(EGφ) iff s |= EGφ s |= Pr<1(EG(φ)) iff s |= ¬EGφ
s |= Pr≥1(CGφ) iff s |= CGφ s |= Pr<1(CGφ) iff s |= ¬CGφ
s |= Pr≥1(DGφ) iff s |= DGφ s |= Pr<1(DGφ) iff s |= ¬DGφ
s |= Pr≤0(Kiφ) iff s |= Ki¬φ s |= Pr≤0(EGφ) iff s |= EG¬φ
s |= Pr≤0(CGφ) iff s |= CG¬φ s |= Pr≤0(DGφ) iff s |= DG¬φ
Proof.
We prove the ﬁrst equivalence; the same method can be used to prove the others.
We ﬁrst prove ⇒.
We have: s |= Pr≥1(Ki(φ)). According to the semantics, we get:









|s′ |= φ| = |s ∼i s
′|.
This means ∀s′ such that s ∼i s
′, s′ |= φ. Thus, s |= Kiφ.
Next we prove ⇐.
s |= Kiφ iﬀ ∀s
′ such that s ∼i s




|s′ |= φ| = |s ∼i s
′| Therefore, s |= Pr≥1(Ki(φ))
Theorem 4.2. Probabilistic and Non-Probabilistic Knowledge
Let b1 and b2 be two boundaries in [0, 1]. The following validity holds:
Pr>b1(Kiφ) ∧ Pr<b2(Kiφ) ⇒ ¬Kiφ ∧ ¬Ki¬φ
Proof. From the left side of the validity, we conclude that 0 ≤ b1 < b2 ≤ 1. Let






< 1. Thus, 0 <
∑
s∼is′
|s′ |= φ| < |s ∼i s
′|. This means some
accessible states from s satisfy φ, but not all of them, and so some others satisfy ¬φ
but not all of them, so the result ﬂows from the semantics of Kiφ.
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Theorem 4.3. Probabilities of Subgroup
1. If s |= EGφ and G
′ ⊆ G, then s |= EG′φ. The same result holds for CG but not
for DG.
2. If s |= Prb(EGφ) and G
′ ⊂ G, then it is not case that s |= Prb(EG′φ). The
same result holds for CG and DG.
Proof.
• For 1, we prove the theorem for EG, the same idea can be used for CG. Let s
be a state such that s |= EGφ. By semantics: ∀s
′ s.t. s ∼EG s
′, we have s′ |= φ.
Because ∼EG=
⋃
i∈G ∼i, we obtain: ∀i ∈ G ∀s
′ s.t. s ∼i s
′ we have s′ |= φ,
which also holds for any subset G′ of G, so we are done. However, for DG as
the intersection of ∼i is considered, it is easy to imagine a scenario where a
subgroup G′ outside the whole intersection so that DG′ does not satisfy φ.
• For 2, we prove the theorem for EG; CG and DG can be proved similarly. The
proof is done by providing two examples with diﬀerent conclusions. Assume that
(s |= Prb(EGφ)) and G
′ ⊂ G. Suppose there are four agents in a group: G =
{Ag1, Ag2, Ag3, Ag4} and each agent has only two epistemic accessible states,
which, except the state itself, are all diﬀerent. Three agents Ag1, Ag2, and Ag3
at state s know φ: s |= K1φ, s |= K2φ, and s |= K3φ . But s  K4φ. Therefore,
|s ∼EG s




is a subgroup G1 = {Ag1, Ag2, Ag3} ⊂ G where s |= Pr≥0.8(EG1φ) because
|s ∼EG1 s
′| = 4, so Prob(s |= EG1′φ) =
4
4
= 1 ≥ 0.8, while for another subgroup
G2 = {Ag1, Ag2, Ag4} ⊂ G, s  Pr≥0.8(EG2φ) because |s ∼
E
G2 s
′| = 3 and
Prob(s |= EG2φ) =
3
4
= 0.75 < 0.8.
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Theorem 4.4. Extended Properties
For all formulas φ and ψ, and all agents i = 1, . . . , n, the following extended properties
for probability hold:
1. Ki(PrbKiφ) ⇒ Ki(Ki(PrbKiφ))
2. PrbKiφ ∧Ki(φ ⇒ ϕ) ⇒ PrbKiϕ
3. Ki(PrbKiφ) ⇒ PrbKiφ
Proof.
• 1 follows directly from the transitivity of ∼i.
• For 2, if s |= PrbKiφ ∧ Ki(φ ⇒ ϕ), then for all states s
′ such that (s ∼i s
′)





b. It follows, using modus ponens, that∑
s∼is′
|s′ |= ϕ| =
∑
s∼is′





b, so the results.
• 3 follows directly from the reﬂexivity of ∼i.
4.3 Model Checking Technique
We propose a reduction-based approach to transform the problem of model checking
PCTLK into the problem of model checking PCTL so that the PCTL’s model checker,
PRISM, can be used to verify PCTLK formulae. Given a PCTLK model MPIS and
a PCTLK formula ϕ
PIS
, we can deﬁne a PCTL model M = F(MPIS) and a PCTL
formula ϕ = F(ϕ
PIS
) such that (MPIS, s0) |= ϕPIS iﬀ (F(MPIS), s0) |= F(ϕPIS).
Thus, the reduction is implemented in two parts: (1) transforming the probabilistic
epistemic model; and (2) reducing PCTLK formulae.
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The workﬂow for model checking PCTLK is summarized in Figure 4.4. The
transformation F translates the inputs: probabilistic interpreted system MPIS and
PCTLK formula ϕ
PIS
into a regular DTMC model F(MPIS) and PCTL formula
F(ϕ
PIS
). This transformation is done automatically by a tool we have implemented,
then we use the PRISM model checker to verify if the obtained model satisﬁes the
obtained formula. In the following, we split the explanation into two parts: models





















Figure 4.4: Veriﬁcation Workﬂow for PCTLK
4.3.1 Translation of MPIS Models
The translation from an MPIS model, which is an epistemic DTMC model, to an
F(MPIS) model is done in two steps. In the ﬁrst step we translate the probabilis-
tic epistemic model MPIS into an equivalent interpreted MDP model M
P
IS that will
be formally deﬁned later (see Figure 4.4). In this step, the key operation is the













G ) needed for M
P
IS. Then, in the second step we trans-
form this equivalent MDP model MPIS into a regular DTMC model M = F(MPIS) by
selecting the speciﬁc action for the formula. These two steps will be explained in this
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section.
The motivation behind the ﬁrst step is that an MPIS is a DTMC model, which
therefore cannot model the nondeterministic behavior of the concurrent processes in
an adequate manner because it only allows deterministic choices. However, Markov
Decision Processes (MDP) that can be viewed as a variant of Markov chains extend-
ing DTMC by allowing nondeterministic choices. Thus, both nondeterministic and
probabilistic choices coexist in MDP. The deﬁnition of MDP as given in [6] is as
follows.
Deﬁnition 4.4. MDP
Over a set of atomic propositions AP , an MDP can be expressed as a tuple
(S, Act, P , Iinit, L, AP ), where:
• S is a nonempty and ﬁnite set of states.
• P : S×Act×S → [0, 1] is the transition probability function, such that for every
state s ∈ S and action α ∈ Act, we have
∑
s′∈S P(s, α, s
′) ∈ {0, 1}.
• Act is a set of actions. At the state s ∈ S, the action α is enabled iﬀ∑
s′∈S P(s, α, s
′) = 1.
• Iinit : S → [0, 1] is the initial distribution such that for all states s ∈ S,∑
s∈S Iinit(s) = 1.
• L : S → 2AP is a state labeling function.
For any state s ∈ S, there is at least one enabled action α. The operational
behavior of an MDP starts with a state s0 such that Iinit(s0) > 0. At every state s,
the system ﬁrst chooses an enabled action nondeterministically from the set Act(s)
of enabled actions at s. Then, it performs this action probabilistically according to
the transition probability function. Thus, a DTMC is a special MDP in which for
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any state s, there is only one action in Act(s). Therefore, by adding actions into a
DTMC, we can create an MDP. Now we can deﬁne the MPIS MDP model obtained
from our MPIS model (step 1).
Deﬁnition 4.5. MPIS Model
Given an epistemic DTMC model MPIS = (W,Pt, Iinit,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ),
MPIS = (S, Act
P , PPt , I
P
init, V
P ) is an MDP model deﬁned from MPIS as follows:
• S = W.






G} is a set of actions. The action
Run labels the transitions obtained from the MPIS transitions, while each ac-
tion Acci labels the transitions obtained from the epistemic accessibility relation






G label the transitions obtained from the





• PPt : S × Act
P × S → [0, 1] is the transition probability function deﬁned as
follows: for all s ∈ S,





′), if α = Run
1
|s∼is′|















, if α = AccDG
• IPinit = Iinit.
• V P = V .
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According to this translation, the transitions of MPIS are obtained (1) from the
transitions of MPIS with the same probabilities; and (2) from the epistemic relations
where the probabilities are equally distributed depending on the number of accessible
states from each given state. For example, if 3 states are accessible from a state s,
then each of the the three obtained transitions will have 1/3 as probability.
Because MPIS, as an MDP, is not deterministic, a policy or strategy should be
used to resolve all the nondeterministic choices by picking an enabled transition for
a state, which induces a Markov chain. In the literature related to MDP, this policy
is called scheduler (or also adversary). A scheduler is a function from the state set S
to the action set ActP such that it chooses in any state s one of the enabled actions.






G that are used to obtain a
DTMC from the obtained MDP model MPIS (step 2).





G . We set the scheduler λ that always selects the transitions labeled
by Run (so the transitions obtained by the accessibility relations are ignored). The
scheduler λi always selects the action Acci from a state s and then selects the action
Run from all the following states (so ﬁrst the accessibility relations ∼i are considered









G respectively from a state s and then select
the action Run from all the following states. It is easy to see that the obtained models
are DTMC for PCTL, which means, the models M = F(MPIS) as explained above.
The following example illustrates this transformation procedure. Figure 4.5
(a) is the MDP model for a system with two agents (i ∈ {1, 2}). The two agents
have the same two local states: Li = {s1, s2}. Thus four combinations of those
local states are possible, making the number of possible global states equal to four:
















































ActionSet1:{(Acc1: 0.5), (Acc2: 0.5), (AccEG: 1/3), (AccCG: 0.25), (AccDG: 1)}
ActionSet2:{(Acc1: 0.5),(AccEG: 1/3),(AccCG: 0.25)}















Figure 4.5: (a): MDP MPIS Model. (b): Scheduler λ1 at State g1
simplicity, the two agents have the same probabilistic transition function Ti speciﬁed
as follows: Ti(s1, Run, s1) = 0.4; Ti(s1, Run, s2) = 0.6; Ti(s2, Run, s1) = 0.9; and
Ti(s2, Run, s2) = 0.1. p and q are atomic propositions and the probabilistic transi-
tions are shown in the ﬁgure as labeled transitions, where the labels have the form
(action−name : probability− value), for instance (Run : 0.24) and (Acc1 : 0.5). The
probabilities associated with the action Run are calculated based on the Ti function.
For instance, the probability of the transition (g1, Run, g2) is computed as follows:
Ti(s1, Run, s1)× Ti(s1, Run, s2) = 0.4× 0.6 = 0.24. The probabilities associated with





G . Figure 4.5 (b) is the same system with scheduler λ1 at the
global state g1. This means, at g1 the action Acc1 is chosen and then the action Run
is chosen from all the other three global states g2, g3, and g4.
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4.3.2 Reducing PCTLK to PCTL
Having transformed the models, now we need to reduce PCTLK formulae into PCTL
formulae. PCTL has the same syntax as PCTLK, except that the epistemic formulae
κ are not included. This reduction process works in stages inductively. Each PCTLK
formula is divided into “maximal state subformulae” such that each maximal state
subformula φ: (1) includes the probabilistic or epistemic operators; (2) diﬀers from
φ; and (3) is not contained in any other state subformula of φ. Each maximal state
subformula is a PCTLK formula, which can be divided into other maximal state
subformulae until no new maximal state subformula can be identiﬁed. Thus, in stage
k, formulae of level k are decomposed into maximal state subformulae of level k−1 or
lower. The lowest level, level 0, contains only atomic propositions and the highest level
is the whole formula. In stage k all maximal state subformulae of φ of level smaller
than k are processed and replaced by new atomic propositions, which are labels of
the subformulae. Before giving an example let us introduce the reduction rules. Let
φ, φ1, φ2 be PCTLK formulae and a be an atomic proposition, the transformation
rules are deﬁned recursively as in Table 4.1:
Table 4.1: PCTLK to PCTL Transformation Rules
Rule Number Rules
1 F(a) = a;
2 F(¬φ) = ¬F(φ);
3 F(φ1 ∧ φ2) = F(φ1) ∧ F(φ2);
4 F(Prb © φ) = Prb ©F(φ);




7 F(Kiφ) = Pr≥1(©F(φ));
8 F(EGφ) = Pr≥1(©F(φ));
9 F(CGφ) = Pr≥1(©F(φ));
10 F(DGφ) = Pr≥1(©F(φ));
11 F(PrbKiφ) = Prb(©F(φ));
12 F(PrbEGφ) = Prb(©F(φ));
13 F(PrbCGφ) = Prb(©F(φ));
14 F(PrbDGφ) = Prb(©F(φ)).
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To complete the reduction process, a DTMC model M = (S,P, Iinit, L, AP )
associated with each PCTL formula should be deﬁned. This is done by specifying
which scheduler is associated with which formula. In the following, (M, s) |=Sch
φ means the PCTL formula φ is satisﬁed in the model M obtained by applying
the scheduler Sch at state s. The following theorem is a direct consequence of the
deﬁnition of F and can be easily proved by induction on the structure of the formula.
Theorem 4.5. Satisfaction Equivalence
(MPIS, s) |= a iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λ a
(MPIS, s) |= ¬φ iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λ ¬F(φ)
(MPIS, s) |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λ F(φ1) ∧ F(φ2)
(MPIS, s) |= Prb © φ iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λ Prb ©F(φ)
(MPIS, s) |= Prb(φ1Uφ2) iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λ Prb(F(φ1)UF(φ2))
(MPIS, s) |= Prb(φ1U
≤nφ2) iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λ Prb(F(φ1)U
≤nF(φ2))
(MPIS, s) |= Kiφ iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λi Pr≥1(©F(φ))
(MPIS, s) |= EGφ iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λE
G
Pr≥1(©F(φ))
(MPIS, s) |= CGφ iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λC
G
Pr≥1(©F(φ))
(MPIS, s) |= DGφ iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λD
G
Pr≥1(©F(φ))
(MPIS, s) |= Prb(Kiφ) iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λi Prb(©F(φ))
(MPIS, s) |= Prb(EGφ) iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λE
G
Prb(©F(φ))
(MPIS, s) |= Prb(CGφ) iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λC
G
Prb(©F(φ))
(MPIS, s) |= Prb(DGφ) iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λD
G
Prb(©F(φ))
Simply put, this theorem states that if the PCTLK formula does not include
epistemic operators, then the corresponding PCTL formula is satisﬁed in the DTMC
obtained by only considering the normal transitions. However, if the formula has the
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form of Kiφ, then the corresponding PCTL formula is satisﬁed in the DTMC ob-
tained by considering ﬁrst the epistemic accessibility relation ∼i and then the normal
transitions, which shows why the K operator is translated to the next operator. The
same intuition holds for the the other epistemic formulae.
Theorem 4.6. Soundness and Completeness
Let MPIS a probabilistic interpreted system and φ be a PCTLK formula, and let
F(MPIS) and F(φ) be the corresponding PCTL model and PCTL formula. Then









We prove this theorem by induction on the structure of the formula φ. The rules 1 to
6 are straightforward (see Table 5.1). We need to consider the rules 7 to 14.
• For rule 7: We know that (MPIS, s) |= Kiψ iﬀ ∀s
′ ∈ W , if s ∼i s
′, then
(MPIS, s
′) |= ψ. Therefore, ∀s′ ∈ S, with the scheduler λi, it follows that every
inﬁnite path π emanating from s satisﬁes that π(1) = s′ and (F(MPIS), s
′) |=λi
F(ψ). Also, the action for the scheduler λi is α = Acci and P
p










= 1, we obtain (F(MPIS), s) |=λi
Pr≥1(©F(ψ)), and vice versa.






• For rule 11: We have that (MPIS, s) |= PrbKiψ iﬀ Prob(s |= Kiψ)  b, where





. Recall that the probability transitions:
Ppt (s, Acci, s
′) = 1
|s∼is′|
for scheduler λi at state s; therefore, Prob(π ∈ Path
λi(s) :
(F(MPIS, s











where π(1) = s′. By the semantics of Prb©, we obtain (F(MPIS), s) |=λi
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Prb(©F(ψ)), and vice versa.







We use the previous example shown in Figure 4.5 to illustrate how to convert
PCTLK formulae into PCTL by levels and identify the states that satisfy each max-
imal state subformula. The PCTLK formula K1(Pr≥0.50((Pr>0.70 © p)Uq)) asserts
that agent 1 knows that at least in 50% of the cases, there is more than 70% of chance
that in the next state p holds until q. The levels of the subformulae of this formula
and the new atomic propositions labeling each maximal state subformula are shown
in Table 4.2:
Table 4.2: Example of Reduction of The Formula K1(Pr≥0.50((Pr>0.70 © p)Uq))
Level Subformulae Transformed subformulae Labeled states set
Level 0 p φ01 = p {g1, g2, g3}
q φ02 = q {g2, g3, g4}
Level 1 Pr>0.7 © p φ
1
1 = Pr>0.7 © φ
0
1 {g1, g2, g3, g4}






2) {g1, g2, g3, g4}
Level 3 K1(Pr≥0.5((Pr>0.7 © p)Uq)) φ
3
1 = Pr≥1 © φ
2
1 {g1, g2, g3, g4}
4.4 Case Study
We implement our reduction-based model checking technique on top of PRISM as
a tool that takes as input PCTLK formulae and MPIS model and produces as out-
put PCTL formulae and DTMC model F(MPIS), which are the inputs of PRISM.
PRISM [66], a probabilistic symbolic model checker, is a tool for formal modeling and
analysis of systems which exhibit random or probabilistic behavior. It supports three
types of probabilistic models, discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs), continuous-time
Markov chains (CTMCs) and Markov decision processes (MDPs). These models can
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be speciﬁed in the PRISM modeling language with a simple, state-based language
that is based on the Reactive Modules formalism of Alur and Henzinger [3]. The
property speciﬁcation language incorporates the temporal logics PCTL, CSL, LTL,
and PCTL∗.
We apply the approach using the modiﬁed protocol of Chaum’s dining cryptog-
raphers [25] as case study. The Dining Cryptographers protocol (DC) aims to get
information from anonymous broadcasting messages and has already been modeled
using agents by various authors [56, 60, 73, 94]. We add an uncertainty situation to
the original protocol and extend it into the Cheating Dining Cryptographers protocol
(CDC). The epistemic and probabilistic properties of the CDC protocol are automat-
ically transformed into PCTL and veriﬁed by the PRISM probabilistic model checker.
4.4.1 Protocol Description
Anonymity is an important issue in the ﬁeld of modern cryptography. The original
Dining Cryptographers (DC) Protocol is introduced by the following scenario [25]:
Three cryptographers are sitting down to dinner at their favorite three-
star restaurant. Their waiter informs them that arrangements have been
made with the maitre d’hotel for the bill to be paid anonymously. One of
the cryptographers might be paying for dinner, or it might have been NSA
(U.S. National Security Agency). The three cryptographers respect each
others right to make an anonymous payment, but they wonder if NSA is
paying.
Based on the assumption that at most one cryptographer is paying, the following
rules can solve the dining cryptographers’ quandary [25]:
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1. Each cryptographer ﬂips an unbiased coin and only shows the outcome to the
cryptographer on his right.
2. Each cryptographer states whether the two coins he can see are on the same
side or on diﬀerent sides.
3. The cryptographer who pays the dinner states the opposite of what he sees.
After running this protocol, all the cryptographers can determine whether it was the
NSA or one of the cryptographers who paid for dinner: an odd number of diﬀerences
indicates that a cryptographer is paying; an even number indicates that NSA is paying.
Also, if a cryptographer is paying, neither of the other two can ﬁgure out who is paying.
This protocol can also be applied to more than three cryptographers.
We assume that cryptographers may make mistakes or deliberately break the
protocol by certain probability (we use cheating index p to indicate it). We aim to
investigate how cheating index p aﬀects the accuracy of cryptographers’ inference.
Kacprzak et al. in [60] also mentioned Cheating Dining Cryptographers (CDC) pro-
tocol but without indicating the degree of cheating. The DC protocol can be seen
as a special CDC protocol with cheating index p = 0 for all the cryptographers. We
discuss the encoding and veriﬁcation of the CDC protocol in the following section.
4.4.2 Protocol Encoding
Our modeling techniques are completely compatible with PRISM implementation.
We translate every agent into a module in PRISM and the entire MAS is deﬁned as
a system with agent modules which are all synchronized. This PRISM system can be







G, we use labels to deﬁne the epistemic relations. To illustrate, label
A1s1 includes a set of states that are equivalent for agent A1 at s1 (λ1), while label
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A1A2s0E or A1A2s0D contains the union or joint of group (agent 1 and agent 2)
accessibility relations at global state (s0) respectively.
label "A1s1" = (s1=0|s1=1|s1=2);
label "A1A2s0E"=(s1=0|s1=1|s1=2|s1=4|s1=5);
label "A1A2s0D" =(s1=0);
Therefore, A1s1 is considered as the set of states that comprises all the states related




We model the CDC protocol diﬀerently from that presented in [60]. We add
cheating index p to indicate the probability of a cryptographer being dishonest (or
making mistakes) since probabilistic interpreted systems allow probabilistic transi-
tions. For simpliﬁcation but without loss of generality, we assume that all the cryp-
tographers have the same cheating index p and generalization to n indices is straight-
forward. When we set all the cryptographers’ cheating indices to 0, the CDC protocol
becomes DC protocol.
To formalize the protocol, we naturally assume that NSA and the three cryp-
tographers have an equal chance of paying the bill. We encode the scenario by using
a probabilistic interpreted system. Each cryptographer Ci is comprised of two vari-
ables: ﬂipping the coin variable and stating results variable. The variable ﬂipping the
coin uses 3 states: ﬂipping coin, head, tail. The variable stating results has 9 states
with the meaning is intuitively explained by their labels: NotDecided, pay, notPay,
seeEqual/pay, seeDiﬀ/pay, seeEqual/notPay, seeDiﬀ/notPay, saidEqual, and saidDiﬀ
(see Figure 4.6).
To model the CDC protocol in PRISM, we add a synchronizing ﬂag for every
cryptographer agent to avoid deadlock. When a cryptographer has announced the
































Figure 4.6: Cheating Cryptographers Protocol (a. Flipping Coins, b. Stating Out-
comes)
synchronizing ﬂags have been set, the system will count all saidDiﬀ and to see if the
number of saidDiﬀ is even or odd we use the integer modulo operation mod.
label "even" = fun(mod, (diff1+diff2+diff3),2)=0;
label "odd" = fun(mod, (diff1+diff2+diff3),2)=1;
4.4.3 Experimental Results
We analyze the veriﬁcation results for the DC and CDC protocols. The presented
experimental results were performed on a DELL desktop computer with 1.86 GHz
Intel Core Duo T6300 processor and 3.25 GB memory under 32-bit Windows WinXP
professional version 2002 Service Pack3 Operating System.
Table 5.4 shows the size and run time for the models that we built for 3 to 10
cryptographers for the DC and CDC protocols. The number of states and transitions
are our model size. The construction time is the time for converting the PRISM model
into Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagram (MTBDD) symbolic model. We can see
as the number of cryptographers increases, the model size increases dramatically, but
PRISM can still handle the large number of states and transitions thanks to the
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Table 4.3: Experimental Results with PRISM
Number Dining Cryptographer Cheating Dining Cryptographer
of Crypt. Number of Number of Construction Execution Number of Number of Construction Execution
(n) States Transitions Time (sec.) Time (sec.) States Transitions Time (sec.) Time (sec.)
3 261 452 < 0.01 < 0.01 503 1,036 0.016 0.017
4 1,286 2,725 0.015 0.015 3,146 8,063 0.016 0.021
5 6,151 15,750 0.031 0.046 18,753 57,882 0.032 0.040
6 28,680 86,919 0.047 0.062 109,378 399,273 0.034 0.049
7 131,081 460,808 0.063 0.078 625,003 2,643,480 0.078 0.109
8 589,834 2,363,913 0.110 0.157 3,515,628 16,936,299 0.094 0.126
9 2,621,451 11,806,730 0.125 0.172 19,531,253 105,670,630 0.141 0.177
10 11,534,348 57,694,219 0.157 0.220 107,421,878 645,191,965 0.188 0.266
11 5.03E+7 2.77E+8 0.128 0.327 5.86E+8 3.87E+9 0.265 0.374
12 2.18E+8 1.31E+9 0.203 0.281 3.26E+9 2.36E+10 0.204 0.297
13 9.40E+8 6.11E+9 0.328 0.515 1.71E+10 1.33E+11 0.453 0.625
14 4.03E+9 2.82E+10 0.469 0.734 9.16E+10 7.69E+11 0.562 0.843
15 1.72E+10 1.29E+11 0.515 0.812 4.88E+11 4.39E+12 0.563 0.860
16 7.30E+10 5.84E+11 0.703 1.047 2.59E+12 2.49E+13 0.765 1.156
17 3.09E+11 2.63E+12 0.813 1.251 1.37E+13 1.40E+14 0.86 1.313
18 1.31E+12 1.18E+13 1.063 1.782 7.25E+13 7.83E+14 1.172 1.797
19 5.50E+12 5.22E+13 1.250 2.047 3.81E+14 4.35E+15 1.515 2.452
20 2.31E+13 2.31E+14 1.546 2.577 2.00E+15 2.40E+16 1.703 2.719
symbolic approach and some internal optimization techniques that PRISM uses to
reduce the model size. For the same number of cryptographers, the CDC protocol
model requires more states and transitions than the DC protocol model because of
the increasing uncertainty. Generally speaking, the building model time for CDC is
also slightly more than the building model time for DC (see part a of Figure 4.7). The
execution time is the total time of constructing the model and computing iteratively
the set of states which are reachable from the initial states and the transition matrix.
As the number of cryptographers increases, the gap between construction time and
execution time increases as well. This means the more cryptographers, the longer
time is needed to compute reachability (see part b. of Figure 4.7).
We use Cipaid to stand for cryptographer i paid the bill and Npaid for NSA
paid the bill. p is the cheating index for cryptographers. We set 3 cryptographers in
the systems and assume that all the cryptographers have the same cheating index for
simpliﬁcation reasons. p = 0 means that cryptographers do not cheat and follow the
















         	 





























         	 
















Figure 4.7: Construction and Execution Time for The CD and CDC Protocols
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Table 4.4: Examples of Veriﬁed Properties for The CDC Protocol with 3 Cryptogra-
phers
Time for Model
No. Formulae Results Checking (sec.)
1 (even ∧p = 0) ⇒
∧
i(Ki(!C1paid ∧ !C2paid ∧ !C3paid)) True 0.002




3 (odd ∧ !Cipaid ∧ p = 0) ⇒ Ki(P≤0.5(Cjpaid)) j = i True (8/16=0.5) 0.005
4 (odd ∧ !Cipaid ∧ p = 0) ⇒ Ki(Cjpaid)) j = i False 0.002
5a. (P = ? Npaid) (for 0 < p < 1 step 0.1) Figure 4.8: NSA pays 0.004
5b. (P = ? !Npaid) (for 0 < p < 1 step 0.1) Figure 4.8: Crypt pays 0.003
6a. (P = ? even ) (for 0 < p < 1 step 0.1) Figure 4.8: even diﬀerence 0.002
6b. (P = ? odd ) (for 0 < p < 1 step 0.1) Figure 4.8: odd diﬀerence 0.002
7a. (P = ? (odd ∧!Npaid)) (for 0 < p < 1 step 0.1) Figure 4.8: odd and Crypt paid 0.003
7b. (P = ? (even ∧!Npaid)) (for 0 < p < 1 step 0.1) Figure 4.8: even and Crypt paid 0.001
8a. (P = ? (even ∧Npaid)) (for 0 < p < 1 step 0.1) Figure 4.8: even and NSA paid 0.001
8b. (P = ? (odd ∧Npaid)) (for 0 < p < 1 step 0.1) Figure 4.8: odd and NSA paid 0.003
The properties expressed in the ﬁrst four formulae are checked for the classical
DC protocol since CDC and DC are equivalent when p = 0. The property encoded
in formula 1 expresses that if NSA pay for the dinner and all the cryptographers are
honest, an even number of diﬀerences is announced so that all the cryptographers
know that the bill is paid by NSA. The properties expressed in the formulae 2 to 4
express that if cryptographer i does not pay the bill and an odd number of diﬀerences
is stated, then i knows that the dinner is paid by one of his partners rather than NSA,
but he does not know exactly who paid.
In PRISM, if φ is a formula, operator P =?φ is used to calculate the probability
of φ. Formulae 5 to 8 show that the probability trends of certain properties vary as
the cheating index changes from 0 (0% cheating) to 1 (100% cheating). The results
of formulae 5a and 5b show respectively the probability that NSA and one of the
cryptographers is paying the bill. The value does not change with cheating index
because the probability of paying the bill is independent from this index. However,
the number of diﬀerences announced changes with the cheating index (formulae 6a and
6b). When the cheating index increases from 0 to 1 the results become unpredictable
because of the high uncertainty (Formulae 7a, 7b, 8a, and 8b).
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Figure 4.8: Veriﬁcation Results of Some Properties in The CDC Protocol for 3 Cryp-
tographers with Regard to The Cheating Index
4.4.4 Comparison with Existing Work
Although the DC protocol has already been modeled by many researchers [56, 60, 73,
94] in diﬀerent ways to represent and reason about knowledge, most of them [60, 73, 94]
only focus on qualitative properties of knowledge, so quantitative properties cannot be
expressed in these approaches. Huang et al. in [56] present a symbolic model checking
algorithm for the veriﬁcation of probabilistic knowledge. Huang et al.’s approach
works on a particular class of interpreted systems called partially observed discrete-
time Markov chains (PO-DTMC), which are synchronous with perfect recall. The
model checking algorithm has been implemented on top of the MCK model checker.
Here we will compare the performance of three model checkers: MCK, MCMAS, and
PRISM for verifying epistemic properties and probabilistic properties.
We veriﬁed two properties of the DC protocol, one epistemic and one prob-
abilistic, using Huang et al.’s method with extended MCK and our approach with
PRISM. MCK is a model checker for the logic of knowledge developed in the School
85
of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of New South Wales. It sup-
ports both linear and branching temporal logics with several diﬀerent ways of deﬁning
knowledge based on the observations made by the agents: observation alone, obser-
vation and clock, and perfect recall of all observations. MCMAS is a symbolic model
checker that is designed for MAS. We verify the epistemic property with MCMAS in
this case study because MCMAS cannot check probabilistic properties. The compar-
ison is under Fedora 16 with 3.1.0 Linux on the same computer for the experimental
results (1.86 GHz Intel Core Duo T6300 processor and 3.25 GB memory).
The ﬁrst property is that if the ﬁrst cryptographer did not pay for the dinner,
he knew that either NSA paid or one of the cryptographers paid, but he did not know
which particular cryptographer paid. This epistemic property for three cryptographers
can be expressed in MCK as follows:
spec spr xn = Xn(neg paid[0]) ⇒ ((Knows C1 ((neg paid[1]) ∧ (neg paid[2])))
∨((Knows C1 (paid[1]∨paid[2])∧neg Knows C1 paid[1])∧neg Knows C1 paid[2]))
(4.13)
where spec spr xn is a speciﬁcation identiﬁer indicating that agents’s knowledge is
based on synchronous perfect recall and the veriﬁcation uses binary decision diagram
symbolic model checking algorithm. neg is a negation operator and Knows is a knowl-
edge operator. paid[i] is a Boolean variable that indicates if cryptographer i paid the
bill. n is an integer stating that in n steps the speciﬁcation holds and X is the next
operator. The same property is expressed in PRISM (Formula (5.3)) and MCMAS
(formula (4.15)) respectively as follows:
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filter(forall, !“C0paid” ⇒ (P >= 1 [X!“C1paid”]& P >= 1[X!“C2paid”])
|((P >= 1[X!“C1paid”]| P >= 1[X!“C2paid”])
& !P >= 1[X“C1paid”]& !P >= 1[X“C2paid”]), “done”& !“C0paid”) (4.14)
AG((odd and !c1paid) → (K(C1, c2paid or c3paid))
and !K(C1, c2paid) and !K(C1, c3paid)); (4.15)
Formula (5.3), where ﬁlter returns values for the identiﬁed set of states which
satisfy the ﬁlter command. In this case, the system will compute values for all states
where cryptographer C1 did not pay the bill.In formula (4.15), c1paid, c2paid, c3paid
are deﬁned in Evaluation section to represent the fact that Cryptographer 1, 2, and
3 paid the bill.
The second property is probabilistic. It indicates that one cryptographer knows
that the other cryptographers have the equal probability to pay the bill. The proba-
bility is either 0 or 1/(n−1) for n cryptographers. In MCK, the probabilistic property
is expressed as follows:
spec spr xn = Xn(negpaid[0]) ⇒ ((Prob C1 paid[1] == Prob C2 paid[2])∧
((Prob C1 paid[1] == 0) ∨ (Prob C1 paid[1] == 0.5))) (4.16)
Although it is easy to calculate path probability in PRISM, it cannot compute
the probability of knowledge directly. However, when we verify a ﬁlter speciﬁcation,
PRISM gives the number of states satisfying the ﬁlter (n1) and the total number of
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ﬁltered states (n2). Based on our deﬁnition of probabilistic knowledge, we are able to
calculate the knowledge probability by computing n1/n2. So, in PRISM, we use the
calculated result of the following expression to get the probability of knowledge:
filter(forall, P >= 1[X“C2paid”], “done”&!“C1paid”&“odd”) (4.17)
Table 4.5: Experimental Results with MCK, PRISM and MCMAS
Number Time for MCK MC Time for Extended PRISM MC Time for MCMAS
of Crypt. Epistemic Probabilistic Epistemic Probabilistic Epistemic
(n) property (sec) property (sec) property (sec) property (sec) property (sec)
3 0.071 1.405 0.003 0.006 0.011
4 0.382 136.6 0.004 0.018 0.014
5 6.181 - 0.005 0.053 0.055
6 - - 0.011 0.063 0.116
7 - - 0.019 0.138 0.21
8 - - 0.022 0.254 0.534
9 - - 0.033 0.48 0.943
10 - - 0.044 0.863 1.844
11 - - 0.059 1.445 2.219
12 - - 0.079 2.366 9.883
13 - - 0.109 3.741 -
14 - - 0.124 5.756 -
15 - - 0.216 8.476 -
16 - - 0.224 12.301 -
17 - - 0.287 17.695 -
18 - - 0.352 24.567 -
19 - - 0.403 33.546 -
20 - - 0.607 45.686 -
Table 4.5 reports the runtime for verifying the epistemic and probabilistic prop-
erties with extended MCK, PRISM and MCMAS. With MCK, we can only the get
runtime of verifying (1) the epistemic property for up to 5 cryptographers and (2)
the probabilistic property for up to 4 cryptographers. With MCMAS, the case can
be scaled up to 12 agents. However, with PRISM, we can get the veriﬁcation results
for up to 20 cryptographers. The runtime for verifying the DC protocol including
20 cryptographers with PRISM is still relatively low, which shows that our approach
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is time eﬃcient and scalable. In fact, for all the numbers of cryptographers ranging
from 3 to 20, PRISM shows better performance for both epistemic and probabilis-
tic properties. The results indicate that for both model checkers, namely extended
MCK and PRISM, probabilistic properties need longer time to be veriﬁed, but our
reduction-based model checking technique outperforms Huang et al.’s approach (See
Figure 4.9). Also, as the size of the system increases, the execution time of all three
model checkers increases: with MCMAS and PRISM, the increase is polynomial with
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Figure 4.9: Runtime for Verifying The DC Protocol
The experimental results show that in verifying the DC protocol, PRISM has
the best performance. This is because in the DC protocol, properties are checked after
all the cryptographers have ﬁnished their actions. The veriﬁcation only happens on
the static environment. In fact, PRISM is designed for quantitative veriﬁcation, while
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MCK and MCMAS are for knowledge veriﬁcation. Our method reduces knowledge
veriﬁcation into probabilistic computation tree logic veriﬁcation, so it beneﬁts from the
eﬃciency of PRISM in verifying such a logic. thanks to the Multi-terminal Binary
Decision Diagram (MTBDD) package used in this model checker,compared to the
limited Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) package used in MCK and MCMAS. However
for reactive dynamic systems that need to recall previous settings, PRISM does not
function well. In contrast, MCK is good at verifying such systems using observations
with perfect synchronous recall. MCK is designed for supporting several diﬀerent
ways of deﬁning knowledge, including synchronous and asynchronous perfect recall
for observations. MCMAS is tailored to the veriﬁcation of MAS scalable systems. It
can be used to verify group knowledge and collaboration among agents.
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Chapter 5
Model Checking Knowledge in
Concurrent Probabilistic Systems
This chapter is largely based on our manuscript submitted to Journal of Computers
and Mathematics with Applications [98]. Our research question 5 is answered in
this chapter. In Section 5.1, we review the deﬁnitions of related concepts, such as
concurrent probabilistic systems and adversaries. In Section 5.2, we explain how
model checking PCTLK can be reduced to model checking PBTL. This reduction
process includes two steps:
1. Model reduction: a PCTLK probabilistic interpreted system is reduced to PBTL
structure (Section 5.2.1), and
2. Formulae transformation: serial rules for converting a PCTLK formula to a
PBTL formula (Section 5.2.2).
The complexity of PCTLK model checking over concurrent probabilistic programs
is analyzed in Section 5.3. and space complexity (Section 5.3.2) are proved to be
polynomial functions in the size of the model and length of the formula. Section 5.4
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discusses symbolic representation of probabilistic interpreted systems with MTBDDs
data structure. We implement our approach with PRISM [69] in Section 5.5 and
analyze the experimental results.
5.1 Concurrent Probabilistic Systems
Concurrency is a property of MAS and other complicated distributed systems in which
several computations are executed simultaneously and potentially interact with each
other. When we use model checking to verify practical systems, they are usually
composed of several explicit models in concurrent systems [12, 65] rather than only
one single explicit model. We consider concurrent probabilistic systems in this chapter,
in which several probabilistic systems work asynchronously and nondeterministically.
Concurrent probabilistic systems exhibit probabilistic and nondeterministic choices.
They can be generated by Markov decision processes [7, 97]. The probabilistic choices
are made by the system itself. Probabilistic systems can be formally expressed using
Markov chains, such as Discrete-Time Markov Chains (DTMCs) or Continuous-Time
Markov Chains (CTMCs). Because our logic is discrete time-based, we use DTMCs
to express the probabilistic choices.
The nondeterministic choices are caused by several components in the systems
working asynchronously. These kinds of choices are beyond the control of the process.
Concurrent probabilistic systems can be seen as combinations of several interactive
DTMC models. Such systems allow several probability distributions to be enabled in
a given state. Baier and Kwiatkowska deﬁned concurrent probabilistic systems in [7]
as a pair P = (S, Steps).
Deﬁnition 5.1. (Concurrent Probabilistic Systems)
A concurrent probabilistic system can be expressed as P = (S, Steps), where
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• S is a ﬁnite set of states.
• Steps is a function that assigns to each state s ∈ S a ﬁnite, non-empty set of
probability distributions μi; each μi is a vector of probabilities, μi = (v0, ..., vn),
such that
∑n
x=0 vx = 1.
We use the notation μi[x] to indicate the value of the distribution μi at the index
x. Steps represents the nondeterministic alternatives in each state. Every element in
Steps represents one probability distribution in the system. For example, for states
s, t ∈ S, one possible distribution μi from Steps(s) will be associated with a DTMC
model, such that μi[x] = P(s, t) for some index x in the vector μi. When the target
state t is known, we use the notation μi(t) instead of μi[x].
Let si ∈ S be a state, μi ∈ Steps(si−1) and μi(si) > 0, a path in a concurrent





−−−→ s2 . . .. The (i+1)th state in a path π is denoted π(i) i.e., π(i) = si.
If π is a ﬁnite path, we denote last(π) as the last state of π and |π| as the length of
the path. We also use σ to stand for a ﬁnite path. and σ(s) to stand for all ﬁnite
paths emanating from s.
The nondeterminism of a concurrent probabilistic system can be determined
with an adversary (alternatively called a scheduler). An adversary is a function from
state set to Steps set. By selecting the same distribution every time when a given
state is reached, an adversary converts the nondeterministic choices into probabilistic
choices. In [70], Kwiatkowska et al. deﬁned an adversary as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.2. (Adversary of a Concurrent Probabilistic System)
An adversary (or scheduler) of a concurrent probabilistic system P = (S, Steps) is a
function A mapping every state s of S to a a distribution on S.
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From this deﬁnition, we can see that an adversary A of the concurrent prob-
abilistic system P chooses the speciﬁc Steps to turn nondeterministic choices into
deterministic ones, which can be expressed as a DTMC model with a transition prob-
ability function P as shown in Equation (5.1). PathA(s) is used to express the set
of all path with the adversary A starting from state s. (we use PA to represent the
transition probability function of the restricted concurrent probabilistic system by the
adversary A , and μ instead of μi when there is no confusion):
PA (s, s′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩





5.2 Model Checking PCTLK in Concurrent Sys-
tems
A model checking approach based on reduction for PCTLK speciﬁcation has been
discussed in Chapter 4 and proposed in [102] which transforms the problem of model
checking PCTLK into the problem of model checking PCTL. In this chapter, we will
transform our model into a PBTL structure that includes a concurrent probabilistic
system and transform a PCTLK formula into a PBTL formula. Given a PCTLK
model MPIS and a PCTLK formula φPIS, we can deﬁne a concurrent probabilistic
system for PBTL structure M = F(MPIS) and a PBTL formula ϕ = F(ϕPIS) such
that (MPIS, s0) |= ϕPIS iﬀ (F(MPIS), s0) |= F(ϕPIS). A PCTLK model MPIS can be
considered as a system that incorporates or independently joins n PBTL models with
S5n [16, 58], where n is the number of agents in the system.
In the following, we split the explanation into two parts: models reduction and
formulae reduction to introduce the details of model checking concurrent probabilistic
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systems against PCTLK speciﬁcation.
5.2.1 Models Reduction
We ﬁrst analyze the similarities and diﬀerences between a probabilistic interpreted
system MPIS = (W,Pt, Iinit,∼i, AP, V ) (0 < i ≤ n) and a PBTL structure C =
(P, I, AP, L). Both models have the same atomic proposition set (AP ), the same
labeling functions (V and L), and the same initial distribution Iinit and I. We can
set these values directly. The diﬀerences are:
1. There are a set of state W , probabilistic transition function Pt, and epistemic
accessibility relations ∼i in an MPIS model but not in a PBTL structure C.
2. A pair P is in C structure while it does not appear in MPIS.
However there are hidden links between these two diﬀerences. A pair P = (S, Steps)
in a PBTL structure includes a set of states S and a set of functions Steps whose ele-
ments are probabilistic transitions for every state. Moreover, if we consider epistemic
accessibility relations ∼i as agent i’s special optional transition Ag i on the concurrent
probabilistic system based on its epistemic accessibility states, we are able to convert
these relations into Steps functions. We can see that a concurrent probabilistic system
is obtained by the parallel composition of n agents’ behavior. A state in a concurrent
probabilistic system will be a tuple (s1, . . . , sn), where si (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) is a state
in agent i’s system. Therefore, model MPIS is a special concurrent probabilistic sys-
tem where two states s = (s1, . . . , sn) and s
′ = (s′1, . . . , s
′
n) are related for agent i’s
program if and only if si = s
′
i.
Based on our analysis, we know that the key to transform a probabilistic in-
terpreted model MPIS into a PBTL structure CIS is to ﬁnd a method to map the
epistemic accessibility relations ∼i to a speciﬁc step Ag i. Epistemic accessibility
95
relations for agent ∼i deﬁne agent i’s possible world in global states. Agent i will
see the same changes/unchanges in its possible world. For example, if (s, t) ∈∼i and
(s, w) ∈∼i, agent i cannot tell the diﬀerence among s, t, w at state s. We can see these
relations as a special transition Ag i indicates that global states change but agent i
cannot be aware of these changes. The probability of these kind of transitions can be
decided by how many global states there are in the agents’ possible world.
Now we can deﬁne the PBTL structure CIS = (PIS, APIS, LIS, IIS) obtained
from our MPIS model.
Deﬁnition 5.3. Structure CIS
Given a probabilistic interpreted modelMPIS = (W,Pt, Iinit,∼1, . . . ,∼n, AP, V ), CIS =
(PIS, IIS, APIS, LIS) is a PBTL structure deﬁned from MPIS as follows:
• PIS = (SIS, StepsIS) is a concurrent probabilistic system, where:
– SIS = W ; and
– StepsIS is a function which assigns to each state s ∈ SIS a ﬁnite, non-
empty set Steps(s) of distributions on SIS. For every s
′ ∈ SIS, the proba-
bility distribution PIS
A (s, s′) is deﬁned by Equation (5.2).
PIS
A (s, s′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
μ(s′) = Pt(s, s









• IIS = Iinit;
• APIS = AP ; and
• LIS = V .
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According to this transformation, the PBTL CIS structure has the same initial
distribution and global state labeling function over the same given set of atomic
propositions as the MPIS model. The labels of the transition set of CIS include
{μ,Ag1, . . . , Agn}, where μ represents the label of the regular transitions of MPIS,
and Ag i represents the epistemic accessibility relation of agent i. After this mapping,
transitions and epistemic accessibility relations are associated with the Steps in a
concurrent probabilistic system. The probabilities on the regular transitions μ of
CIS are obtained from the transitions of MPIS with the same probabilities. For
simplicity, we assume that epistemic accessibility relations are uniformly distributed
among agents’ possible world states. Therefore, the probability of transitions on
adversary Ag i for a state can be obtained by the inverse of the total number of
accessible states. For example, if 3 states are accessible from a state s for agent i,
then each of the the three obtained transitions will have 1/3 probability for the label
Ag i.
Because CIS is a nondeterministic system, a policy or strategy should be used to
resolve all the nondeterministic choices. We use an adversary, which was introduced in
Deﬁnition 5.2 to make the concurrent probabilistic systems deterministic. We divide
adversaries into two types: one is a regular probabilistic transition adversary that we
represent as λ and another the transition converted from an agent epistemic acces-
sibility relation that we denote as λi. Here we show how two particular adversaries
λ and λi are used to obtain a deterministic system from a concurrent probabilistic
system for PBTL structure CIS.
From each state in CIS there are two kinds of enabled steps: regular transition
μ and epistemic relation Ag i. We set the adversary λ that always selects the transi-
tions labeled by regular transition μ (so the transitions obtained by the accessibility
relations are ignored). The adversary λi always selects the steps Ag i from a state
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s and then selects the regular transiton μ from all the following states (so ﬁrst the
accessibility relations ∼i are considered and then the normal transitions).
Next we will introduce the set of reduction rules for PCTLK formulae.
5.2.2 Formula Reduction
In this section, we will explain how to reduce PCTLK formulae into PBTL formulae.
Most PBTL and PCTLK formulae have the same operators and syntax except:
1. PBTL allows universal (∀) and existential (∃) path quantiﬁers while path quan-
tiﬁers are not eligible in a PCTLK formula; and
2. PCTLK includes the epistemic formulaKiφ and probability of epistemic formula
PrbKiφ but PBTL does not.
Based on the syntax of PCTLK, we can conclude that all PCTLK path formulae are
equivalent to PBTL path formulae with existential quantiﬁers. Therefore, if we add
the existential quantiﬁer ∃ to a PCTLK path formula, the PCTLK path formula will
be a PBTL path formula. From the semantics of the epistemic formula Kiφ, we can
imagine that if formula φ is satisﬁed in all agent i’s epistemic accessibility states, then
Kiφ holds. Thus, we can transform the epistemic operator Ki to the next operator
based on the epistemic accessibility relation ∼i.
This reduction process, similar to the process presented in the previous chapter,
works in stages inductively. We ﬁrst divide each PCTLK formula into “maximal
state subformulae” such that each maximal state subformula φ: (1) includes the
probabilistic Prb or epistemic operatorKi; (2) diﬀers from φ; and (3) is not contained
in any other state subformula of φ. Each maximal state subformula is a PCTLK
formula, which can be divided into other maximal state subformulae until no new
maximal state subformula can be identiﬁed. Thus, in stage k, formulae of level k
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are decomposed into maximal state subformulae of level k − 1 or lower. The state
subformulae of level k are deﬁned inductively as follows:
• Level 0 contains atomic propositions;
• Level (k + 1) (k ≥ 0) contains all stage subformulae φ′ such that all state
subformulae of φ′ are of level k or less and φ′ is not contained in any lower level.
Therefore, the lowest level, level 0, contains only atomic propositions and the
highest level is the whole formula. In stage k all maximal state subformulae of φ of
level smaller than k are processed and replaced by new atomic propositions, which
are labels of the subformulae. Before giving an example, we introduce the reduction
rules. Let φ, φ1, φ2 be PCTLK formulae, a be an atomic proposition and F(φ) be
a PBTL formula that transforms from PCTLK; the transformation rules are deﬁned
recursively as in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: PCTLK to PBTL Transformation Rules
Rule Number PCTLK subformula converted subformula
1 a F(a)
2 ¬φ ¬F(φ)
3 φ1 ∧ φ2 F(φ1) ∧ F(φ2)







To complete the reduction process, a step for the reduced concurrent probabilis-
tic model F(MPIS) associated with each PBTL formula should be deﬁned. This is
done by specifying which adversary is associated with which formula. In the follow-
ing, (F(MPIS), s) |=λ φ means the PBTL formula φ is satisﬁed in the model F(MPIS)
obtained by applying the adversary regular λ at state s, while (F(MPIS), s) |=λi φ
is associated with agent i’s epistemic accessibility relation at state s. The following
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theorem is a direct consequence of the deﬁnition of F and can be easily proved by
induction on the structure of the formula.
Theorem 5.1. Satisfaction Equivalence
(MPIS, s) |= a iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λ a
(MPIS, s) |= ¬φ iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λ ¬F(φ)
(MPIS, s) |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λ F(φ1) ∧ F(φ2)
(MPIS, s) |= Prb © φ iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λ Prb∃©F(φ)
(MPIS, s) |= Prb(φ1Uφ2) iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λ Prb(F(φ1)∃UF(φ2))
(MPIS, s) |= Prb(φ1U
≤nφ2) iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λ Prb(F(φ1)∃U
≤nF(φ2))
(MPIS, s) |= Kiφ iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λi Pr≥1(∃©F(φ))
(MPIS, s) |= Prb(Kiφ) iﬀ (F(MPIS), s) |=λi Prb(∃©F(φ))
Simply put, this theorem states that if the PCTLK formula does not include
epistemic operator Ki, then the corresponding PBTL formula is satisﬁed a Steps
distribution in the concurrent probabilistic systems obtained by only considering the
normal transitions. However, if the formula has the form of Kiφ, then the corre-
sponding PBTL formula is satisﬁed in the Steps obtained by considering ﬁrst the
transition associated with the epistemic accessibility relation ∼i and then the normal
transitions, which shows why the K operator is transferred to the next operator.
In fact, PCTLK language can be seen as a variant of CTLK [85] by replacing
the path quantiﬁers ∃ and ∀ by the probabilistic operator Pr. PCTLK provides
possibility b for path formulae to specify the likelihood of the path. The critical
values, 0 and 1, state two speciﬁc situations: Pr≥1(ψ) stands for the path formula
ψ happens all the time; while Pr≤0(ψ) represents the negation of the path formula
ψ. Therefore, when we constrain that the probabilistic relation can only be “≥ 1” or
“> 0”, PCTLK turns into CTLK: Pr≥1 is equivalent to ∀ and Pr>0 is equivalent to ∃.
100
PCTLK also is an extension of PCTL [6, 52] as it includes the epistemic operator Ki.
The properties expressed using PCTL can be checked by the PRISM model checker
[67]. Therefore, based on PCTLK syntax, a formula can be a CTL formula, a CTLK
but not PCTL formula, a PCTL but not CTLK formula, a conjunction of CTLK and
PCTL like Kiφ∧Pr>0.5(ψ), or a pure epistemic probabilistic formula under the form
Ki(Prb(ψ)). The structure of PCTLK is shown in Fig. 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Structure of PCTLK
Theorem 5.2. Soundness and Completeness
Let MPIS a probabilistic interpreted system and φ be a PCTLK formula , and let
F(MPIS) and F(φ) be the corresponding PBTL structure and PBTL formula. Then
MPIS |= φ if and only if F(MPIS) |=λ F(φ) or F(MPIS) |=λi F(φ), based on the
formula being without or with the epistemic operator Ki.
Proof.
We prove this theorem by induction on the structure of the formula φ. The rules 1 to
3 are straightforward (see Table 5.1). We need to consider the rules 4 to 8.
• Rule 4 for formula φ = Prb © ψ. We have that (MPIS, s) |= Prb © ψ if and





For adversary A (s) = λ, we know that PIS
A (s, π(1)) = Pt(s, π(1)). Therefore,
Prob(s, σ(s),©ψ) = Prob(π ∈ Pathλ(s) : (F(MPIS, π) |=λ ©F(ψ)). Accord-
ing to Prb∃© semantics for PBTL, we obtain (F(MPIS), s) |=λ Prb∃©F(ψ).
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On the other hand, for adversary λ, if (F(M)PIS, s) |=λ Prb ∃ © F(ψ), it is
straightforward that (MPIS, s) |= Prb © ψ. The same method can be used to
prove Rule 5 and Rule 6.
• Rule 7 for formula φ = Kiψ. We have that (MPIS, s) |= Kiψ iﬀ ∀s
′ ∈ W , if
s ∼i s
′, then (MPIS, s
′) |= ψ. Consequently, ∀s′ ∈ SIS, if A (s) = Agi, then it
follows that every inﬁnite path π emanating from s satisﬁes that π(1) = s′ and
(F(MPIS), s







obtain (F(MPIS), s) |=λi Pr≥1(∃©F(ψ)), and vice versa.
• Rule 8 for formula φ = PrbKiψ. We have that (MPIS, s) |= PrbKiψ iﬀ









for A (s) = Agi at state s; therefore,
for adversary A (s) = Agi, Prob(π ∈ Path













, where π(1) = s′. By the se-
mantics of ∃©, we obtain (F(MPIS), s) |=λi Prb(∃©F(ψ)), and vice versa.
Therefore, the theorem.
5.3 Complexity Analysis
Many researchers have already investigated the complexity of model checking con-
current systems against temporal logic [41, 65, 77]. The complexity of concurrent
probabilistic systems against probabilistic temporal logic like PCTL speciﬁcations are
also explored in [13, 24]. In [7], Baier and Kwiatkowska already proved that the time
complexity of model checking for PBTL over concurrent probabilistic systems is a
polynomial function of the size of the PBTL structure and a linear function of the
size of the PBTL formula. Furthermore, these model checking problems can be solved
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on space of O(|φ| · n + n ·m), where n is the number of states and m is the number
of transitions in the PBTL structure and |φ| is the length of the formula.
In this section, we will analyze both the time complexity and space complexity
of model checking PCTLK with respect to the size of the system model and the length
of the formula.
5.3.1 Time Complexity
In this subsection, we will prove that the running time for model checking PCTLK
for Markov chains is polynomial in the size of the explicit model and the length of the
formula.
Theorem 5.3. The time complexity of the model checking problem for PCTLK for
Markov chains is polynomial in the size of the explicit model and the length of the
formula.
Proof. PCTLK extends PCTL and PCTL is a subset of PBTL [7]. Thus, PCTLK
extends PBTL as well. It is known from [7] that the model checking problem for
PBTL for Markov chains can be solved in time polynomial in the size of the explicit
PBTL structure and linear in the length of the formula. Thus, we need only to analyze
the time complexity of our model transformation and formula reduction.
To go from our model MPIS to PBTL structure CIS, atomic propositions APIS,
set of states SIS, initial distribution IIS, and labeling functions LIS can be obtained
directly from MPIS. Therefore, these parts of the transformation will run in a linear
time in the size of the model. We need two stages to generate Steps for PBTL struc-
ture CIS. First, we add the regular transition μ into Steps; the value of probabilistic
transitions PIS(s, s
′) can be copied from Pt(s, s
′) of our MPIS model directly. This
stage will run in O(k) time, where k is the number of transitions in the Markov chain.
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Then, we convert each epistemic accessibility relation ∼i into a transition Ag i and
compute the value of this transition. To compute the probability of this transition,
we need to count the number of epistemic accessible states for agent i at state s.
This can run in O(m) time, where m is the number of states in the system. Thus, to
convert PIS we need O(n ·m) time, where n is the number of agents in the system. In
other words, the complexity of generating Steps for the PBTL structure is quadratic
in the size of the MPIS model (O(k+ n ·m)). Therefore, the complexity of the whole
transformation is quadratic in the size of the model structure.
To transform a PCTLK formula φ, the procedure will recursively apply the
transformation rules until a PBTL F(φ) subformula is encountered. Therefore, the
depth of the recursion is bounded by the length of the formula φ. Thus, the transfor-
mation is linear in the length |φ|.
Because model checking PBTL for Markov chains can be solved in polynomial
time in the size of the explicit model and linear in the length of the formula [7],
model transformation can be performed in quadratic time in the size of the model,
and formula reduction can be executed in linear time in the length of the formula,
we conclude that the complexity of model checking PCTLK for Markov chains is
polynomial in the size of the explicit Markov chain and the length of the formula.
Theorem 5.4. The model checking problem for PCTLK over Markov chains is P-
complete.
Proof. Membership: From Theorem 5.3, we get that the upper bound of the model
checking problem is polynomial in the size of the Markov chain and the size of the
formula.
Hardness: to prove the hardness, we need to prove that every problem A in the
class P is polynomial time reducible (we use ≤P to express polynomial time reduction)
to the problem of model checking PCTLK for Markov chains. We know from [29,
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88] that model checking CTL for explicit models is P-complete. Therefore, A ≤P
MC(CTL) (we use MC(X) to represent model checking problem of language X and
L(X) to express the language of X). Also L(CTL) ≤P L((PCTL) ≤P L(PCTLK),
(because all CTL formulae can be expressed in PCTL, and PCTL is a subset of
PCTLK), and explicit systems can be seen as a subset of Markov chains with all
probability transitions are 1. Consequently, problem A can be polynomially reduced
to the model check problem of PCTLK for Markov chains (A ≤P MC(PCTLK))
1.
So we can conclude that the model checking problem for PCTLK for Markov chains
is P-complete.
5.3.2 Space Complexity
In this subsection, we will prove that the complexity of PCTLK model checking for
concurrent probabilistic systems is PSPACE-complete.
Theorem 5.5. Let |φ| be the size of the state formula φ, n the number of agents in
the concurrent probabilistic system, m the number of states in the system, and k the
number of transitions in the system. The model checking problem for PCTLK on this
concurrent probabilistic system can be solved in space O(|φ| ·m+m · (k + n ·m)).
Proof. It is known from [7] that the space complexity for PBTL over a concurrent
probabilistic system is O(|φ′|·m+m·k), where |φ′| is the size of PBTL formula φ′, m is
the number of states, and k is the number of transitions in the system. In Section 5.2,
we have presented transformations of probabilistic epistemic modelsMPIS for PCTLK
to concurrent probabilistic systems CIS for PBTL and of a PCTLK formula φ to a
PBTL formula F(φ) so that MPIS |= φ if and only if CIS |= F(φ). We just need to
analyze if the space complexity of model transformation and formula transformation
1If a problem B is P-complete and B ≤P C, where C is in the class P, then C is P-complete.
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is polynomial. Next we prove that a deterministic Turing machine TM computes the
model reduction in polynomial space in the size of the input PCTLK model.
TM reads in the input tape a model of PCTLK MPIS and generates the PBTL
structure CIS in the output tape, one by one, the same atomic propositions, states, the
initial distribution, and labeling functions as the input. Furthermore, TM writes μ(s′)
into StepsIS for state s when TM reads a probabilistic transition function Pt(s, s
′)
from the input model. TM reads epistemic relations s ∼i s
′ from the input model
one by one and for each one, it writes Ag i into StepsIS for state s in the output
tape. These two steps are executed in space O(k + n ·m), where k is the number of
transitions, m is the number of states, and n is the number of agents in the system.
In fact, the generated PBTL structure has m states and k +m · n transitions.
On the other hand, from Table 5.1, we can see that the length of the PBTL
formula F(φ) is linear in the length of the original formula φ.
Based on complexity of our reductions and the result from [7], we can conclude
that the model checking problem for PCTLK on a concurrent probabilistic system
can be solved in space O(|φ| · m + m · (k + n · m)), where |φ| is the length of the
PCTLK formula.
Theorem 5.6. The space complexity of PCTLK model checking for a concurrent
probabilistic program is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. Membership in PSPACE follows from Theorem 5.5.
To prove the hardness, we need to prove that every problem A in PSPACE can
be polynomially reduced to the problem of model checking PCTLK over concurrent
probabilistic systems. We know that model checking CTLK for concurrent systems
is PSPACE-complete [77]. Therefore, A ≤P MC(CTLK). Moreover, the CTLK
model checking problem over concurrent systems can be reduced polynomially to the
PCTLK model checking problem over concurrent probabilistic systems because all
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CTLK formulae are PCTLK formulae as well (see Figure 5.1) and concurrent systems
can be seen as concurrent probabilistic systems with all probability transitions equal
to 1. Therefore, MC(CTLK) ≤P MC(PCTLK), so the result.
5.4 Symbolic Representation with MTBDDs
In this section, we will introduce how to represent probabilistic interpreted systems
with Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagrams (MTBDDs) and develop symbolic
model checking algorithms for PCTLK. We choose MTBDD representation to be able
to use the PRISM model checker [69] that provides an MTBDD engine. In fact, the
MTBDD representations of probabilistic interpreted systems and MDPs, which are
supported by PRISM, are exactly the same.
5.4.1 Introduction to MTBDDs
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) were originally created by Lee[71] and enriched by
Akers [1]. MTBDDs are extended from BDDs; thus they have inherent BDD features.
An MTBDD M is a rooted directed acyclic graph associated with a set of ordered
Boolean variables x1 < · · · < xn. An MTBDD data structure can be considered as
a mapping function fM(x1, . . . , xn) : B
n → R. Nodes in MTBDDs are classed as
either non-terminal or terminal. Unlike BDDs where terminal nodes can only be 0
or 1, terminal nodes in MTBDDs are allowed to be real numbers other than 0 and
1. A terminal node m is labeled by a real number val(m). A non-terminal node
m is labeled by a variable var(m) ∈ (x1, . . . , xn) and has then(m) and else(m) two
children.
The order over the Boolean variables in MTBDDs is based on a position and
value of a node. For two non-terminal nodes m1 and m2, if var(m1) ≤ var(m2),
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then m1 ≤ m2. A non-terminal node is less than a terminal node, for example, if
m1 is a non-terminal node and m2 is a terminal node, then m1 < m2. The order
for a non-terminal node m and its children then(m) and else(m) is m < then(m)
and m < else(m). In MTBDDs’ data structure, two terminal nodes m1 and m2
are equivalent if and only if val(m1) = val(m2). For non-terminal nodes, two nodes
are identical when conditions: 1) var(m1) = var(m2), 2) then(m1) = then(m2),
and 3) else(m1) = else(m2) are all satisﬁed. MTBDDs are eﬃcient because they
can be compact without any redundancy. For example, if two children are equal,
then(m1) = else(m2), then these two nodes will be combined to one node and all
incoming edges are redirected to this unique child. MTBDDs have been used to
encode real-valued matrices in [30]. These MTBDDs can be considered as a square
2n × 2n matrix mapping function: Bn × Bn → R. Every element aij can be viewed
as the value of a function f : {0, . . . , 2n−1} × {0, . . . , 2n−1} → R. If we take Boolean
variables (x1, . . . , xn) to range over row indices and Boolean variables (y1, . . . , yn) to
range over column indices, this matrix can be seen as a probability transition matrix
of Markov chains; therefore an MTBDD can be used to represent the probabilistic
transition system. We use an MTBDD obtained from f : (x1, y1, . . . , xn, yn), which
means we require the variables from the rows and columns to alternate, so that a
recursive structure on the matrix is suited for eﬃcient recursive algorithms for all
standard matrix operations [37].
5.4.2 MTBDDs Model Representation
Now let us encode a probabilistic interpreted model MPIS. Given an MPIS =
(W,Pt, Iinit,∼1, . . . ,∼n, AP, V ), then the number of Boolean variables required to
encode states W is m = log2|W |, where |W | is the number of states in the system.
We use an m Boolean variable tuple x = (x1, . . . , xm) to represent each element
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s ∈ W . Each tuple x = (x1, . . . , xm) is then identiﬁed with a Boolean formula,
represented by a conjunction of variables or their negation. Consequently, the set
of states is encoded by taking the disjunction of the Boolean formulae encoding the
states. We also introduce m more variables y = (y1, . . . , ym) to encode the destination
states. If we encode Boolean variables x and y to range over source and destination
states, we can encode the transition probability matrix Pt of MPIS model [84]. The
initial distribution Iinit can be represented by a vector using real numbers. Each
agent in the model can be encoded as a k Boolean variables z = (z1, , . . . , zk), where
k = log2(n + 1) (n + 1 is the number of agents in the system including the system
itself). Then, we use the same method used for Pt encoding to encode n epistemic
accessibility relations ∼i. If there is an epistemic accessibility relation between a
source state and a destination state for agent i, we set the matrix ∼i for elements
that represent this source state and destination state value as 1. (For purposes of




























Figure 5.2: An Example of Probabilistic Interpreted System Model
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We use an example to illustrate the encoding process. The probabilistic in-
terpreted system is shown in Figure 5.2. There are two agents in the system. The
solid lines with numbers are probabilistic transitions. The dashed lines with ∼1 are
epistemic accessibility relations for agent 1, while lines with ∼2 represent relations
for agent 2. The probability transition function Pt, initial distribution and epistemic
accessibility relations are listed in the following matrices. We normalize epistemic
accessibility relations such that the probabilities from state s must sum to 1 and use
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1/2 0 1/2 0
0 1 0 0
1/2 0 1/2 0
0 0 0 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
To convert this probabilistic interpreted system into MTBDD, we need 2 Boolean
variables for encoding agents z = (z1, z2) and 2 Boolean variables for encoding states
x = (x1, x2). z1 = 0 and z2 = 0 represents the system, z1 = 0 and z2 = 1 is agent 1,
and z1 = 1 and z2 = 0 stands for agent 2. Similarly for states: there are 4 states in
the system; therefore we can use (x1, x2) = (0, 0), (x1, x2) = (0, 1), (x1, x2) = (1, 0),
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Figure 5.3: An MTBDD Encoding Example
Figure 5.3 is the MTBDD M for the probabilistic interpreted system. Non-
terminal nodes are drawn as circles and terminal nodes as the numbers indicating
the value of nodes. For the purpose of clariﬁcation, we omit the zero terminal node
and any edges which lead directly to it . Non-terminal node then and else oﬀsprings
are connected with solid and dashed lines respectively to their parent. We divide
this MTBDD into three parts: (z1, z2) = (0, 0), (z1, z2) = (0, 1) and (z1, z2) = (1, 0)
to represent probability transitions, epistemic relations for agent 1, and epistemic
relations for agent 2.
We can trace the appropriate path through the MTBDD to get the value of the
function fM . Tabel 5.2 generates from Figure 5.3 and shows the function fM which the
MTBDD M represents. For example, fM(z1, z2, x1, y1, x2, y2) = fM(0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1) =
0.6. We denote (s, s′)0 to represent probability transition from state s to s′, (s, s′)i to
be epistemic accessibility relations for agent i. Based on our encoding rules, we know
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Table 5.2: The Function that The MTBDD Represents
Agent Number z1 z2 x1 y1 x2 y2 fM(z1, z2, x1, y1, x2, y2) PIS
A
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 (s0, s0)
A0 = 0.4
0 0 0 0 0 1 0.3 (s0, s1)
A0 = 0.3
0 0 0 1 0 0 0.3 (s0, s2)
A0 = 0.3
System 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 (s1, s1)
A0 = 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 (s3, s1)
A0 = 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 0.4 (s2, s2)
A0 = 0.4
0 0 1 1 0 1 0.6 (s2, s3)
A0 = 0.6
0 1 0 0 0 0 1/3 (s0, s0)
A1 = 1/3
0 1 0 0 0 1 1/3 (s0, s1)
A1 = 1/3
0 1 0 1 0 0 1/3 (s0, s2)
A1 = 1/3
Agent 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1/2 (s1, s0)
A1 = 1/2
0 1 0 0 1 1 1/2 (s1, s1)
A1 = 1/2
0 1 1 0 0 0 1/2 (s2, s0)
A1 = 1/2
0 1 1 1 0 0 1/2 (s2, s2)
A1 = 1/2
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 (s3, s3)
A1 = 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 (s0, s0)
A2 = 1/2
1 0 0 1 0 0 1/2 (s0, s2)
A2 = 1/2
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 (s1, s1)
A2 = 1
Agent 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1/2 (s2, s0)
A2 = 1/2
1 0 1 1 0 0 1/2 (s2, s2)
A2 = 1/2




0 = 0.6. In fact, we can abstract the transition probability matrix PIS
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1/3 1/3 1/3 0
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0 1 0 0
1/2 1/2 0 0
0 1 0 0
−−−− −−− −−−− −−−
0 0 0.4 0.6
1/2 0 1/2 0
1/2 0 1/2 0
−−−− −−− −−−− −−−
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
The modiﬁed NetBill protocol is implemented with PRISM in the next section
to verify probabilistic and epistemic properties to illustrate our approach.
5.5 Case Study
PRISM is a tool for the automatic veriﬁcation of randomized or probabilistic behaviors
via probabilistic model checking. PRISM allows us to verify PCTL formulae over
Markov chains or Markov decision processes. In this section, we model the NetBill
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protocol and verify its probabilistic and epistemic properties using this tool. Although
PRISM does not support PCTLK logic, with our approach introduced in Section 5.2,
we are able to convert PCTLK logic into PBTL logic with an existential quantiﬁer.
Moreover, we know from Section 2.4 that all PBTL formulae with an existential
quantiﬁer are the same as PCTL formulae. Therefore, with our model and formulae
reduction, we can use the PRISM model checker to verify probabilistic epistemic
properties.
5.5.1 Encoding
NetBill protocol is developed for online shopping encryption. The basic protocol
involves one customer agent Cus and one merchant agent Mer interacting to ﬁnish
an online shopping process. This protocol can also be applied to more than one
customer and one merchant. The size of the model can be easily scaled up by the
number of customers and merchants to benchmark the time and space complexity of
our approach. We modiﬁed this protocol with probability transitions.
A customer requests a quote from the merchant for an item to initialize the
protocol. Five percent (5%) of these requests will fail to be sent to the merchant
due to internet connection issues. The merchant replies to the successfully delivered
request by presenting a quote for the requested item. After a customer gets the
quote, thirty percent (30%) of customers reject the oﬀer and end the protocol without
purchase. The other 70% of customers accept the oﬀer and pay for the item. Ten
percent (10%) of payments will be nulliﬁed due to connection issues and card issues.
Thus, after the merchant provides the quote to the customer, there is 63% chance she
will receive the payment for the item. When the merchant receives the payment, then
she will deliver the items to the customer. Ninety-nine percent (99%) of deliveries









































Figure 5.4: NetBill Protocol Probability Transition (a) Merchant, (b) Customer
depicts the merchant and customer probabilistic models.
We encode this protocol by using a module in PRISM for every agent and the
entire system is deﬁned as a process in which these agent modules can interact with
each other. The local states of the merchant or the customer are deﬁned as variables.
The global states of the system are obtained from the Cartesian product of the local
states of all modules. Therefore, the epistemic accessibility relations for agent i at
state s include all the global states with module i ’s local variable s. We use labels to
deﬁne the epistemic relations. To illustrate, label A1s1 includes a set of states that
are equivalent for agent A1 at s1 (λ1). In other words, label A1s1 includes all states
that show other agents’ next-step behaviors when agent A1 is in state s1.
label "A1s1" = (s1=0|s1=1);
Therefore, A1s1 is considered as the set of states that comprises all the states related
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to s1 by ∼1.
The probability transitions of each module are described by a set of commands
that indicate the updated local variables and probabilities for a given local variable.
We uploaded the entire code for verifying the epistemic and probabilistic properties for
the NetBill protocol using the PRISM probabilistic model checker on the open-source
project website SourceForge.net2
Many properties, such as safety, liveness, and reachability, can be checked in the
NetBill protocol and are easy to express using PCTLK. Some examples of tested for-
mulae are listed in Table 5.3 (for a system including one merchant and one customer):
Table 5.3: Formula Examples
φ1 = ¬Pay → P≤0.02(KmerPay)
φ2 = ¬P≥0.98(F ((KcusDelivery) ∧ ¬Delivery))
φ3 = Delivery → P≥0.99(KcusDeliver)
φ4 = P≥0.55KcusDeliver
Formulae φ1 and φ2 express examples of the safety properties i.e., “unexpected
events will not occur in the system”. In conventional quality model checking, the
safety property is expressed by AG¬p, where p is an “unexpected” situation that
should be avoided. However, human beings make mistakes in the real world; thus,
when we design a system, we set a conﬁdence interval such that we allow for inconsis-
tencies to occur within a buﬀer zone. In probability model checking, safety properties
can be expressed as “unexpected events” have a low probability of occurring or high
probability of not occurring. For example, “chances that a merchant thinks that a
customer has already paid but the customer has not actually paid is less than 2%”
(formula φ1), or “there is greater than 98% chance that it will not occur that the
customer receives the item and the merchant did not deliver it to her” (formula φ2).
2https://sourceforge.net/projects/mcepistemicprob/ﬁles/NetBill/?
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After we deﬁne the epistemic relations as labels “CustomerNPay” and “Merchant-
KnowPay”, the same properties are expressed in PRISM as follows:
“CustomerNPay” ⇒ P <= 0.02 [F (P >= 1[X“MerchantKnowPay”])] (5.3)
P >= 0.98 [F (P >= 1[X“CustomerKnowDel”) ∧ (!“MerchantDel”)] (5.4)
In contrast to the safety property, a liveness property states “an expected event
will eventually happen”. Formula φ3 expresses the liveness property that after the
merchant delivers the item, the customer will be aware of it and will receive the item
eventually. The liveness property can be expressed in PRISM as follows:
“MerchantDel” ⇒ P >= 0.99 [F (P >= 1[X“CustomerKnowDel”)] (5.5)
Formula φ4 is an example of a reachability property, which means a particular
situation can be reached from the initial state. In probabilistic model checking, we
are able not only to state that a particular event will eventually occur, but also to
present the probability that this event happens. If formula φ4 is true, it means that
there is a 55% chance a customer will receive a delivered item after having sent a
request. The following expression in PRISM encodes this property.
P >= 0.55 [F (P >= 1[X“MerchantDel”)] (5.6)
We have encoded the NetBill protocol with PRISM using the method presented
in this section and we have veriﬁed this protocol experimentally with up to 15 agents.
Experimental results are reported in the next section.
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5.5.2 Experimental Results
The experimental results of the example described in the previous section are pre-
sented in Table 5.4. These results were performed using PRISM 4.1 on a Toshiba
Porte´ge´ computer with 2.00 GHz Intel Core2 Duo T6400 processor and 3GB memory
under a 64-bit Windows Vista Operating system.
Table 5.4: Experimental Results for Netbill Protocol with PRISM
No. of Model MTBDD Construction Memory
Agents States Transitions Nodes Leaves Time(sec) (MB)
2 24 51 144 13 0.038 0.360
3 186 545 537 20 0.044 0.512
4 1,606 5,811 2,842 38 0.062 0.792
5 11,670 49,561 7,662 69 0.086 1.656
6 81,190 395,871 16,401 97 0.145 2.352
7 560,886 3,093,505 29,929 134 0.203 3.588
8 3,900,166 24,049,791 49,364 171 0.289 5.088
9 27,447,270 187,402,273 76,328 228 0.405 6.68
10 195,874,150 1,468,699,791 112,723 282 0.601 13.428
11 1,417,856,406 11,592,991,393 160,310 365 0.851 16.472
12 10,403,792,326 92,189,803,551 221,384 440 1.194 20.772
13 77,299,568,070 738,305,984,545 298,209 536 1.721 34.492
14 580,781,161,510 5,950,385,865,711 393,229 630 2.561 42.143
15 4,406,497,035,126 48,220,171,890,721 572,245 994 3.733 65.392
Table 5.4 reports the state space, MTBDD size, time and memory usage in
the construction of the example. We increase the number of agents by adding more
merchants or customers into the NetBill system. For reasons of simplicity, we have
increased customer agents and kept a maximum of two merchants in the system. The
second and third column report statistical data of the model (number of states and
number of transitions) that reﬂect the state space. Column four and ﬁve present
the number of nodes and leaves in MTBDD that represent the model. The last two
columns indicate the time for converting the PRISM model into an MTBDD symbolic
model and the memory usage for constructing the model. From Table 5.4, we notice
that the number of states surges dramatically as the number of agents increases,
but the growth is not exponential. Moreover, the size of the MTBDD data structure
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(including nodes and leaves) grows much more slowly than the model size. This means
that the MTBDD data structure is more eﬃcient as the model size increases. The
time and memory usage for constructing the model do not increase exponentially, but
only polynomially when augmenting the number of agents (See Figure 5.5). In order
to compare time and memory usage in the same ﬁgure, we modiﬁed this by dividing
memory usage by 10. These experimental results conﬁrm the complexity presented in
Section 5.3.
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Figure 5.5: Model Construction Time/Memory Usage
We veriﬁed the four formulae listed in the previous section. All those formulae
hold for a one-customer and one-merchant NetBill protocol. As all the formulae are
similar in terms of time and space complexity, in the following, we only focus on
the reachability property (formula φ4). Table 5.5 shows veriﬁcation results of this
formula. Agents’ types are indicated in this table as C and M for customer and
merchant respectively. We also included the number of Boolean variables required to
encode the NetBill protocol in column “Bool vars”. We found that although PRISM
is able to construct models for NetBill protocol with 15 agents, it only can verify
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a formula for a model with 13 agents (2 merchants and 11 customers). There are
39 Boolean variables that are required to encode NetBill protocol with 13 agents,
corresponding to a maximal state space of size 239 ≈ 1011. This result is consistent
with PRISM speciﬁcation for the MTBDD engine 3.
Table 5.5: Veriﬁcation Results for Formula φ4
Agents No. Results States Transitions Bool vars Time(sec) Memory (MB)
2 (1M1C) True 24 51 6 0.007 1.184
3 (2M1C) True 186 545 9 0.028 1.844
4 (2M2C) True 1,606 5,811 12 0.146 2.924
5 (2M3C) True 11,670 49,561 15 0.816 5.24
6 (2M4C) True 81,190 395,871 18 3.626 20.068
7 (2M5C) True 560,886 3,093,505 21 12.368 44.376
8 (2M6C) False 3,900,166 24,049,791 24 39.691 67.892
9 (2M7C) False 27,447,270 187,402,273 27 94.554 140.756
10 (2M8C) False 195,874,150 1,468,699,791 30 226.196 175.356
11 (2M9C) False 1,417,856,406 11,592,991,393 33 554.748 -
12 (2M10C) False 10,403,792,326 92,189,803,551 36 1067.6 -
13 (2M11C) False 77,299,568,070 738,305,984,545 39 2112.587
Table 5.5 indicates that model checking time rises as the model gets larger.
Memory usage follows the same trend as the veriﬁcation time. Time and memory
usage both increase polynomially with the number of agents and model size (see
Figure 5.6). We also notice that the formula does not hold for 8 or more agents in
the protocol (2 merchants and 6 customers in the trail). The reason is that as the
number of agents in the system increases, interactive behavior among agents leads to
increasing uncertainty.
We evaluate the probability of this property with “P =?” operator in PRISM.
The result is listed in Table 5.6. The probability of the formula holding for two agents
in the system is 0.6646, while for 8 agents the probability drops to 0.545. Figure 5.7
shows that after having 4 agents in the system, the probability of a customer knowing
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Figure 5.6: Veriﬁcation Result of Formula φ4
Table 5.6: Percentage of Successful Delivery
Agents No. 2 3 4 5 6 7
Probability 0.6646 0.6545 0.6518 0.629 0.6005 0.571
Agents No. 8 9 10 11 12 13
Probability 0.545 0.521 0.4996 0.4804 0.4633 0.4482














Figure 5.7: The Probability for a Successful Delivery
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we ﬁrst list the main contributions of our research in Section 6.1. The
potential directions for future work are indicated in Section 6.2.
6.1 Contributions
The objective of this dissertation is to tackle the problem of epistemic-probabilistic
model checking in MAS. The theoretical contributions are shown in Figure 6.1. The
main contributions of our research may be summarized as follows:
• Theoretical contributions:
1. We deﬁned probabilistic-epistemic logic PCTLK [100, 101] to specify quan-
tiﬁed knowledge properties in MAS. PCTLK not only allows probabilities
of paths (i.e. runs), but also represents quantiﬁed knowledge. We also
built the model MPIS of PCTLK, which integrated Discrete-Time Markov
Chains (DTMCs) with interpreted systems, to model MAS. The reason
behind choosing DTMCs as our basic models is that DTMCs are widely
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Figure 6.1: Theoretical Contributions
of PCTL, the predecessor of PCTLK. On the other hand, the formalism of
interpreted systems has been proved to be an eﬃcient formalism for mod-
eling key characteristics of agents’ knowledge to allow the inter-operability
between global (the system) and local (agents) models. Therefore, MPIS
can eﬀectively express quantiﬁed knowledge of MAS.
2. A new reduction-based model checking approach is developed to convert
PCTLK model checking into PCTL model checking [102]. This reduction
is achieved by transforming the models of PCTLK into MDPs, which are
then transformed to DTMCs using the notion of scheduler. We proved the
soundness and completeness of this transformation stating that a PCTLK
formula is satisﬁed in a model of PCTLK if and only if a corresponding
PCTL formula is satisﬁed in a DTMC model of PCTL. Therefore, formulae
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of PCTLK can be simply checked using the probabilistic model checker
PRISM.
3. The complexity of PCTLK model checking over concurrent probabilistic
programs has been analyzed. We investigated the eﬀectiveness of our
approach along with analyzing the computational complexity of PCTLK
model checking problem. We proved that PCTLK model checking in con-
current probabilistic programs is PSPACE-complete and can be solved in
polynomial time in the size of the model and length of the formula for
Markov chains.
4. We explored the symbolic representation of probabilistic interpreted sys-
tems with Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagrams (MTBDDs) to use
the MTBDD engine of PRISM.
• Practical contributions: Two concrete case studies have been implemented with
various model checkers to show applicabilities of our proposed techniques along
with performance analysis and comparison with other approaches:
1. A modiﬁed dining cryptographers protocol which includes uncertainty knowl-
edge has been implemented with three diﬀerent model checkers: the prob-
abilistic model checker PRISM, the multi-agent model checker MCMAS,
and the model checker for knowledge MCK. The results and comparisons
are presented in [102].
2. In [90] and [98], we veriﬁed probabilistic commitment properties and prob-
abilistic knowledge of a modiﬁed NetBill protocol with PRISM. This pro-
tocol has also been used in [2] and is implemented using extended NuSMV
and CWBNC to verify knowledge and commitment properties.
• Collaborations:
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During my thesis research, I collaborated with colleagues in commitment and
knowledge representations and jointly published a book chapter [11], a journal
paper [90], two conference papers [43] and [42], and a journal paper is under
review [2].
6.2 Future Work
Our probabilistic knowledge model checking is an ongoing project. There are a number
of areas for future research in probabilistic and epistemic veriﬁcation in MAS. In the
future, we will focus on the following aspects:
• Currently, our model checking algorithms are based on reduction techniques to
alleviate the state explosion problem of model checking. We plan to investigate
the use of other model checking techniques such as symbolic model checking,
unbounded model checking, predicate abstraction, etc. to ﬁnd better solutions
for probabilistic and epistemic model checking.
• Another important issue is to integrate the trust component to our probabilistic
logic. An important application is to measure probability of agent’s knowledge
based on opinions of other agents in the systems and how much those agents
are trusted.
• Model checking epistemic and probabilistic logic can also be applied to the
knowledge revision area to check if by revision and addition of new knowledge,
the model still satisﬁes speciﬁcation properties. We consider the applicability of
this model to a range of practical case studies in diﬀerent areas such as services
computing and business applications.
• We also like to develop dedicated tools for converting our probabilistic epistemic
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model into models that are supported by existing model checker such as PRISM,
MCK, MCMAS, and NuSMV.
• Developing a dedicated probabilistic model checker or embedding probabilistic
epistemic features into the PRISM model checker are interesting problems for
our future research. We are interested in collaborating with the PRISM team
at Oxford to add our algorithms to a new version of PRISM.
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